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Abstract 
The corporate social performance of a diverse group of firms in global supply chains was 
assessed. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a global issue that affects not only 
enterprises themselves, but also their suppliers, and requires firms to care about not only 
environmental issues but also social issues in their supply chains. Thus firms should deal with 
CSR issues via supply chain management to improve their corporate social performance. The 
work bridges a gap in management scholarship on CSR and supply chain management by 
addressing corporate social performance in supply chains.  
     The approach used is a statistical analysis of 215 metal smelters that have successfully 
implemented systems for management of social issues at their suppliers. Specifically, the social 
issue is of interest is mining of minerals that finances warfare and results in severe human 
rights violations – the so-called conflict minerals problem associated with the human rights 
abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjacent areas. The Conflict-Free 
Smelter Program (CFSP) is a response to these concerns for the extraction of tin, tantalum, 
tungsten and gold (3TG) minerals. 
      Two dependent variables were operationalised. The “commitment group” divides the 
compliant smelters into four groups based on their voluntary willingness to engage in the 
CFSP: leaders, followers, middle majority and laggards. The “implementation period” 
measures the number of days a firm took from committing to the CFSP standards to actually 
becoming compliant, thus representing a firm’s implementation performance. Four 
independent variables were assessed: firm location, firm ownership, management system 
experience, and firm size. The results for the commitment group generally align with the 
findings of previous scholars, that larger firms from developed countries are more inclined to 
do CSR. However, the results for the implementation period did not align with findings of 
previous scholars. Various explanations are considered and related to business scholarship and 
theory. The results imply that many kinds of firm can participate in corporate social 
performance initiatives and CSR initiatives could be applicable beyond the metal industry. 
Moreover, it is concluded that legislative and market forces can be effective drivers of 
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corporate social performance of firms in global supply chains, including small firms and 
companies in developing countries.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Context 
      Over the past decades, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become increasingly 
important for firms to operate. However, CSR still has no consistent definition, and 
overlapping concepts for CSR include business ethics, sustainability, and stakeholder 
management (Carroll& Buchholtz, 2014). CSR is often conceptualized by the triple bottom 
line approach (Elkington, 1998), which distinguishes the environmental, social, and economic 
impacts of corporations (Hart & Caggiano, 2003; Bansal, 2005). A firm's implementation of 
CSR involves “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law” (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006, p. 3). According to 
McWilliams et al. (2006), CSR encourages a firm to make a positive impact on the natural 
environment and in dealing with its relationships with stakeholders including investors, 
employees, clients and communities. Some researchers have stated that the construct of CSR 
today has two main characteristics: first, it illustrates the relationship between the business and 
the society; second, it refers to a firm’s voluntary activities in both environmental and social 
aspects (Carroll and Buchholtz, 2000; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001; Hill et al., 2003; Marrewijk and Werre, 2003).   
       With the rapid globalization of society, CSR is not just a firm’s in-house concern. CSR 
requires that a firm fulfill its responsibilities in environmental and labour practices during 
global trading (Jenkins, 2001; Maloni & Brown, 2006; Business for Social Responsibility, 
2001; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2004; Jørgensen & Nielsen, 2001; Oxford Research, 2003; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers & DILF, 2004; Roberts, 2003). Each firm also has a responsibility 
for the practices of its global trading partners, including suppliers (Andersen and Skjoett-
Larsen, 2009). Supply chain management (SCM) plays a significant part in helping a firm 
fulfill its social responsibilities. Corporations have to extend the reach of their CSR policies 
both to their overseas subsidiaries and their suppliers (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). 
Sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) addresses sustainability issues in sourcing. 
Both environmental impacts and social issues are addressed in the conceptual framework of 
SSCM. However, the current literature on SSCM mainly focuses on the environmental aspect, 
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and there is limited knowledge on the social aspect in SCM. Research on the management of 
social issues in SSCM lags far behind that on environmental issues (Yawar & Seuring, 2014). 
This situation has been gradually changing, and some studies now consider the social aspects 
in SCM, rather than only environmental issues (Seuring & Müller, 2008). These social aspects 
that exist in the supply chain include working conditions, child labour, human rights, health 
and safety, minority development, accessibility and gender discrimination (Yawar & Seuring, 
2014).  
       Firms should deal with the social issues that may exist in supply chains to improve their 
social performance. CSR addresses both environmental performance and social performance 
(Carroll & Buchholtz, 2000; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001; Van Marrewijk & Werre, 2003). Wood (1991) described that corporate 
social performance is a configuration of principles of social responsibility and outcome of 
social relationship. Corporate social performance constitutes the social performance outcome 
(Wood, 1991). It is a significant outcome of social performance of a firm’s undertaking of CSR 
activities (Wood, 1991; Wood, 2010). However, unlike environmental performance, corporate 
social performance is not easy to quantify, which is the main problem that needs to be faced in 
this thesis.  
        One specific social problem that arises in SCM is conflict mineral sourcing. Conflict 
minerals are illegally extracted from regions experiencing conflicts in Central Africa, mostly 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and nine adjoining countries. The trade in these 
minerals is believed to fund rebel groups in the region who are propagating civil conflicts. The 
most common conflict minerals are tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold (3TG), and they pass 
through a variety of intermediaries before being purchased by multinational electronics 
companies.    
       As conflict minerals are associated with severe social problems in the supply chain, efforts 
have been made to deal with these problems.  Relevant legislative frameworks have been 
created, including the Dodd-Frank Section 1502 and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance. Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by the US Congress in 2010, 
aims at stopping the national army and rebel groups in the DRC and adjacent areas from 
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illegally using profits from the minerals trade to fund their fight. A disclosure requirement now 
mandates firms to determine whether their products contain conflict minerals during their 
supply chain due diligence (OECD, 2013). The OECD Due Diligence Guidance is a 
comprehensive CSR instrument to be formally negotiated and approved by governments 
aiming to have responsible supply chains when taking minerals from conflict-affected areas, it 
provides detailed suggestions to help conflict-mineral-related firms respect human rights and 
avoid increasing military conflicts through their mineral purchasing decisions and practices 
(OECD, 2013). 
      The Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) is a mechanism to help monitor the sourcing 
of metals and assist smelters in meeting the standards set out in the Dodd-Frank Section 1502 
and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance (CFSI, 2015). These standards focus on reducing 
human rights abuse, and violence in conflict territories of and around the DRC (CFSI, 2015). 
The CFSP is a flagship program of the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI), and it covers 
all 3TG smelters and refiners. Under the CFSP, audits of 3TG smelters and refiners are carried 
out by credible independent third-party auditors, and these smelters that meet the requirements 
of the audit protocols are validated as conflict free (CFSI, 2015). 
      CFSP participation reveals that a smelter or refiner realizes the significance of social issues 
in the business and its own social responsibility. Young and Dias (2012) stated that the CFSP 
represents “a novel mechanism of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and supply-chain 
sustainability management, which can be described as a Non-State Market-Driven initiative” 
(p1). Non-governmental organization stakeholders are not included in the program 
management but are formally consulted on a regular basis.  
       The list of firms in compliance with CFSP displays that smelters are a varied group, with 
different backgrounds, location, ownerships management system experience and sizes.  The 
growth of CFSP compliancy among smelters is an example of CSR; that is these have engaged 
in a voluntary international responsibility initiative. By April 2016, two hundred and fifteen 
CFSP smelters had participated in CFSP. Of these 215, some smelters are from developed or 
developing countries; some are private, publicly traded, or state-owned; some smelters may or 
may not have implemented ISO standards; and some vary in size with the number of the staff 
they employ. Thus, an opportunity is raised that there some patterns behind the CFSP 
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participation of these smelters with such diverse composition.  
          In this thesis, data analysis is the major research methodology to test the relationship 
between these firm characteristics and corporate social performance.  The data sample is the 
two hundred and fifteen firms in the compliant smelter list of CFSP by April, 2016.  The 
findings of this thesis can be generalized from CFSP to other CSR initiatives of firms in other 
business sectors.  The results from the two hundred and fifteen CFSP compliant smelters could 
be used as an example that can be expanded to improve social performance in other industries.  
 
1.2  Thesis Structure  
       Chapter 2 reviews the theories which connect the drivers that propel firms to engage in 
CSR initiatives.  Chapter 3 presents the findings of previous scholars on CSR and SCM and 
identifies conflict mineral sourcing as a significant social issue, and CFSP as a CSR 
management tool to cope with the problem.  Chapter 4 presents the research questions and 
proposes the hypotheses based on the findings of previous scholars.   Chapter 5 provides the 
methodology for this study. Chapter 6 presents the results of the data analysis and compares 
the results with the hypotheses.  Chapter 7 compares results and findings of previous scholars, 
and implications and applications for future researches.  
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework 
      While a firm chooses to adopt CSR practices voluntarily, there exist institutional pressures 
(Zhu & Sarkis, 2007; Clappison, 2012; Minoja & Zollo 2012; Hallbäck, 2012), stakeholder 
pressures (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Sarkis et al., 2011), and firms vary 
in their resources and capacities (Darnall et al., 2008; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006) – all of 
which have been described to have significant effects on a firm’s CSR adoption. 
 
2.1 Institutional Theory 
      According to Hoffman (2015), “Institutional Theory emphasizes environmental problems 
as being not primarily technological or economic in character but behavioural and cultural” 
(p.9).  Bazerman and Hoffman (1999) state that societal institutions direct the development of 
environmentally destructive behaviour which is caused by technological and economic 
activities. Institutional theory recognizes that social, economic, political and cultural norms 
constitute an institutional structure.  
Some scholars have agreed that institutional pressure can be a driving force to impel 
management decision-makers of a firm to adopt CSR practices (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007; 
Clappison, 2012; Minoja & Zollo, 2012; Hallbäck, 2012; Fligsten, 2001; Roe, 1994). 
Institutional pressures on sustainable supply chain practices and performance include market, 
regulatory, and competitive advantage (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007).  
 Market pressure is defined as the pressures from customers (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). The 
market pressures will encourage organizations to enact policies about its positive or 
negative impact on the physical environment (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). Because of the 
market pressures, firms will lose additional customers and which in turn, influences 
their economic performance, if they do not change their behaviour to what is favored 
by customers (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007).  
 
 Although CSR is voluntary, regulatory pressure from the government can still push the 
firms to pursue CSR and implement CSR practice, so that the firms will fulfill their 
social responsibility (Clappison, 2012; Minoja & Zollo 2012; Hallbäck, 2012).  Zhu 
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and Sarkis (2007) found that regulation is a main pressure for firms to adopt 
environmentally friendly practices (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007; Jennings & Zandbergen, 
1995). Weaver, Trevino and Cochran (1999) found that institutional pressures from 
government impel firms to implement CSR programs. For instance, since 1977, China 
has greatly developed its environmental laws. The Chinese government has made 
environmental issues increasingly important in its economic development strategies. 
Additionally, new laws and policies have been created to protect the environment such 
as the Cleaner Production Promotion Law that mandates businesses to implement 
environmental management systems (EMS) (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). 
 
 Competitive advantage plays a significant role for corporate environmental response 
(Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). To increase its competitive advantage, firms choose to follow 
CSR standard, which can help attract more customers and investors, increasing their 
profits (Minoja & Zollo, 2012; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
 
 
2.2 Stakeholder Theory  
Some scholars categorize stakeholders as either primary or secondary stakeholders 
(Darnall, Seol & Sarkis, 2009; Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  Primary stakeholders include 
value chain participants from consumers to suppliers, and from management to non-
management employees; secondary stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) are not 
directly involved in the firm’s economic transaction, and they can be societal stakeholders 
(Henrique & Sadorsky, 1996) and environmental regulators.  Other scholars (Daily &Huang, 
2001; Hanna, Rocky Newman & Johnson, 2000; Sharma & Henriques, 2005; Seuring & 
Müller, 2008; Freeman, 1984) categorized stakeholders as either internal or external 
stakeholders. Internal stakeholders are employers and employees, who are the initiators and 
recipients of an organization’s activities, such as proactive environmental activities (Daily & 
Huang, 2001; Hanna et al., 2000). According to Seuring and Müller (2008), external 
stakeholders include customers, government, and NGOs. Unlike internal stakeholders, external 
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stakeholders do not have the control of critical resources of the organizations (Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005; Freeman, 1984).  Rather, they have the ability to regulate or stimulate the 
public opinion in favor of or in opposition to the organization’s practices (Sharma & 
Henriques, 2005; Freeman, 1984). 
Stakeholder pressure can be a significant driver for firms to adopt various sustainable 
practices (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Sarkis et al., 2011). Firms should 
not only pursue profits, but also present their ethical concern and inform their stakeholders that 
they should be socially responsible (Solomon & Lewis, 2002).   According to Sarkis et al. 
(2011), there are two different stakeholder pressures: the pressures from government, which 
are significant drivers for firms to implement environmental proactive practices (Kilbourne, 
Beckmann & Thelen, 2002), and pressures from customers, which have driven the adoption of 
sustainability practices in SCM. By implementing proactive environmental practices, firms are 
able to establish collaborative relationships with government and customers and find more 
ways except regulatory that can encourage firms to have greater environmental improvements 
to address the concerns from both government and customers (Darnall, 2008; Sarkis et al, 
2011). 
Furthermore, requirements from customers and investors who want the companies to 
follow CSR standards can strongly push a firm to change itself to become more sustainable 
(Solomon & Lewis, 2002; Minoja, 2012). Exports and sales to foreign customers are an 
important driver that stimulate firms to adopt sustainability practices (Ball & Craig, 2010). 
Customers may require products that are more sustainable, more environmentally and socially 
friendly, while an investor wants the firms they invested into have a good social and 
environmental performance (Kim, 2009; Solomon & Lewis, 2002; Minoja & Zollo, 2012). 
Based on these arguments, it is concluded that stakeholder concern can be a significant driving 
force to prompt a firm to adopt sustainability practices to fulfill their social responsibility, and 
these concerns could be from investors, customers, suppliers and governments. Firms want to 
maintain the relationship with their stakeholders, especially investors and customers, so that 
they will not lose them in their business. 
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2.3 Resource-Based View  
Resource-based view (RBV) is an approach to achieving a competitive advantage and it 
appeared in the 1980s and 1990s (Oliver, 1997). The RBV is established on the principle that 
competitiveness is a function of distinctive and valuable resources controlled by a firm (Oliver, 
1997). Resources can refer to the assets of a firm, its capabilities to create benefits, and 
competitive advantage in the market (Oliver, 1997). Resources have been considered to be 
quite a significant factor to increase a firm’s competitiveness (Gallego-Alvarez, 2011). Some 
scholars categorize the resources as tangible and intangible resources (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; 
Hall, 1992). Tangible assets are physical things that a firm has, including land, buildings, 
machinery, equipment and capital. These resources can be bought from the market, but they 
provide little advantage to the firms in the long run, because their competitors can soon obtain 
the same assets (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; Hall, 1992). Intangible assets are not physical ones but 
still can be owned by the firm. Typical intangible assets include brand reputation, trademarks, 
and intellectual property, such as patents (Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003; Hall, 1992). Unlike tangible 
resources, intangible resources are built over a long time, and it is also something that other 
firms cannot purchase from the market. If a firm possesses critical intangible resources that its 
competitors in the market cannot copy or purchase easily, the firm could obtain the competitive 
advantage in the market (Cho & Pucik, 2005). Intangible resources are usually within a firm 
and are the significant source of the firm’s competitive advantage in market competition 
(Riahi-Belkaoui, 2003).  
Resources can be used by firms to develop and implement their strategies (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006). Engaging in social responsibility activities has costs, such as purchasing 
environmentally friendly equipment, implementing strict quality controls, or new health, safety 
and environmental programs (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). Darnall et al. (2008) state that 
organizational capabilities are required to adopt management systems and to implement 
sustainability practices in SCM. Hedström and Swedberg (1998) indicate that CSR initiatives 
could be a great opportunity that is currently available to firms to achieve greater success 
through new products and new technologies. If the firm owns these new products and 
technologies that other competitors do not have, the resources could be a great advantage that 
pushes the firm to take an active part in CSR initiatives (Hedstrom et al. (1998). The literature 
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identifies that a company must have resources to participate in CSR initiatives and, without 
adequate resources, it will not adopt CSR principles. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
3.1 Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains  
       In recent years, increased globalization and continued outsourcing have stimulated 
industries to operate on a global supply chain (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). Corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) demands that firms fulfill their responsibilities for environmental 
and labour practices in their global trading (Business for Social Responsibility, 2001; Jenkins, 
2001; Maloni & Brown, 2006; Pedersen & Neergaard, 2004; Jørgensen & Nielsen, 2001; 
Oxford Research, 2003; Roberts, 2003).  Firms have to expand their CSR policies not only to 
overseas subsidiaries, but also to their global suppliers (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009). 
Based on the arguments in the literature, CSR requires a firm to care about their environmental 
and labour practices, not only for themselves, but also for their global subsidiaries and 
suppliers. 
 
3.2 Supply Chain Management  
The development of supply chain management (SCM) has a history of over one hundred 
years.  In the early 20th century, SCM theory focused on increasing operational efficiency and 
reducing waste (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007), mainly on efficient operations and processes. 
Environmental sustainability and the SCM has a history throughout decades, but the academic 
and management research that focuses on this field has had only ten to fifteen years (Ballou, 
2006).  In the early 1990s, the concepts of the environment and business, industrial ecology 
and industrial ecosystem research which was the basis of environmental supply chain 
management grew rapidly (Seuring, Sarkis, Müller & Rao, 2008). With the development of 
these concepts, SCM started to address environmental issues (Seuring et al, 2008; Andersen & 
Skjoett-Larsen, 2009).   
As Seuring et al. (2008) mention, most of the early work of sustainability in SCM was to 
identify and describe how to achieve environmentally sound supply chain systems. During the 
early time, the concept of sustainability began to incrementally come into the corporate 
environmental management system (EMS) (Seuring et al, 2008). A complete sustainable 
supply chain management (SSCM) was developed to address both the economic and 
  11 
environmental performance of a firm, and include the aspects of internal environmental 
management, green purchasing, eco-design, supply and demand sustainability, cooperation 
with customers, environmental purchasing and sustainable supply chain (Seuring & Müller, 
2008; Sarkis & Zhu, 2007; Sarkis, Zhu & Lai, 2011).  The literature on environmental issues 
in supply chains (Carter and Dresner, 2001; Zhu & Sarkis, 2007) stated that the impact of 
activities in supply chains on the natural environment should be considered when the managers 
make management decisions. SSCM addresses the environmental issues in the supply chain 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008). Specifically, SSCM takes a more holistic systems view on the total 
environmental impacts of the supply chain on resource consumption and ecological footprints 
(Sarkis, 2003; Bowen et al., 2001; Preuss, 2005) 
Based on the arguments of the scholars, although the concept of SCM has been developed 
for a long time, the sustainability being integrated into SCM has developed only over one 
decade and recent literature on SSCM addresses more on economic and environmental issues 
in SCM. 
 
3.3 Social Issues in Supply Chain Management (SCM) 
       Scholars have mentioned that social issues in SCM involve child labour, human rights, 
health and safety, development of minorities, disabled people inclusion and gender 
discrimination (Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Yawar & Seuring, 2014; Seuring & Müller, 2008).  
It is evident that most SCM research is still influenced by environmental issues (Seuring & 
Müller, 2008). The concept of sustainability should not only include economic and 
environmental issues, but also include social issues (Seuring & Müller, 2008). Andersen and 
Skjoett-Larsen (2009) also stated that CSR is a broader concept to a firm’s overall treatment 
of both human beings and the environment, not just limited to the supply chain. However, the 
integration of economic, environmental, and social aspects, which are three dimensions of 
sustainability is still rare in current academic papers. Management of social issues is far behind 
the economic and environmental issue in the supply chain (Klassen & Vereecke, 2012; Seuring 
& Müller, 2008).  
 Nevertheless, in recent years, there has been a gradual increase in the quantity of literature 
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associated with social issues in sustainability performance of firms (Yawar & Seuring, 2015). 
Wood (1991) emphasized that the identification of social issues is a significant aspect of CSR. 
Environmental and social criteria should be fulfilled at the same time by supply chain 
members, so that the sustainability can remain within the supply chain comprehensively 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008). Therefore, social performance should be addressed in the same way 
as environmental performance Environmental performance is often addressed in the current 
research on CSR, and is usually quantified by energy efficiency, emission reduction and 
pollution prevention. Corporate social performance constitutes the social performance 
outcome of firms’ participation in CSR activities, and it has value creation and business care 
(Wood, 1991; Wood, 2010). However, corporate social performance is difficult to quantify, as 
measures are lacking or limited. This is difficulty is addressed in the methodology of this study.  
 
 
3.4 Conflict Mineral Sourcing  
Conflict mineral extraction is an important social issue that has emerged over the last 
decade in supply chains. Conflict minerals are minerals extracted in a conflict zone and selling 
minerals extracted from these areas will support the local conflicts (DiJohn, 2002). Statistical 
evidence indicates that belligerent groups in conflict zones have accessibility to precious 
commodities, so that they can increase the conflicts (DiJohn, 2002). The most critical example 
is the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and adjacent areas, 
where various armies, rebel groups get the benefits from selling minerals and contribute to 
violence and human rights abuse during wars in these regions (Young, Zhe, & Dias, 2014). 
The most significant mined conflict minerals contain tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold (Young, 
2015; Young et al., 2014), called the 3TGs.  
Social issues are a severe problem in conflict- affected areas, which is revealed in conflict 
mineral sourcing (Kalisya, et al., 2011; Jenkins, 2014). In conflict mineral sourcing, typical 
social problems, such as human rights abuse, working conditions and child labour problems 
are especially shocking (Kalisya, Justin, Kimona, Nyavandu, Eugenie, Jonathan & Hawkes, 
2011; Jenkins, 2014). Human rights are not respected in these conflict areas.  The labourers 
who work in the mines controlled by war belligerent groups are not protected under the law, 
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because there is not effective enforcement of government legislation. Furthermore, a safe and 
health working condition cannot be ensured; for labourers who work in such mines, health and 
safety are not considered by the army groups as they are forced by belligerent groups to work 
(Kalisya, et al., 2011; Jenkins, 2014).  Therefore, sourcing of conflict minerals in these groups 
controlled areas is seriously harmful to the society and human rights, and the sourcing in 
conflict areas as a very specific issue that addresses one area of social sustainability should be 
paid attention (Young, et al., 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1. Supply Chain of the 3TG Metals (Young et al., 2014) 
 
     To understand the social issues in the conflict mineral sourcing, it is necessary to determine 
the tiers of the supply chain of conflict mineral related products.  Figure 1 displays the process 
of metals being collected from the ground and finally assembled by the Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEM), revealing that the supply chain is complex. There are quite a number 
of actors and layers (as many as eight tiers) involving various suppliers in the world (Young et 
al., 2014). First, the minerals are sourced from various mines that are located in different 
countries throughout the world. After being sourced from the ground, these minerals are 
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delivered or traded to smelters. Some smelters have their own mines, so that they can use the 
minerals from their mines directly. For smelters who do not own mines, they trade with mining 
companies or other traders. Smelters and refiners source the metal ore or purchases from 
traders, and produce metals or their compounds; the smelted or refined metals are sold to 
traders, and go through the tiers of chemicals and materials, components, assembly, and finally 
flow to the OEMs.  OEMs refer to the firms that make a part or subsystem that is used in 
another firm's end product (Chien & Shih, 2007).  Figure 1 implies that OEMs are the peak of 
the supply chain.  The metals or other compounds are purchased from smelters and refiners by 
various traders and are made as different components, which are finally assembled to make 
electronic products, such as laptops and smartphones (Young & Dias, 2012). As these 
electronic products are widely used in the world, massive conflict minerals are in great 
demand. Because of the high volume of conflict minerals demand, which potentially increases 
the seriousness of social issues caused by conflict mineral sourcing. Materials are mixed in 
production processing stages of smelters and refiners in the metal supply chain (Young & Dias, 
2011). At this chokepoint, mineral ores and concentrates originating from different part of the 
world are processed and refined to produce the crude or refined metals used in products and 
product components, which are purchased by different traders and finally obtained by OEMs 
(Young et al., 2008).  
 
 
 
3.5 Solutions to Conflict Sourcing  
       To solve the social issues brought by conflict mineral sourcing, many efforts have been 
made. Achieving conflict-free sources of minerals, and thus, products must be a result of 
combined efforts of governments, international organizations and private sectors.  
3.5.1 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502 
       The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed by the US 
Congress in July 2010, includes a provision, section 1502, which is a disclosure requirement 
that calls on US firms to determine whether their products contain conflict minerals. This 
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section requires US firms to carry out supply chain due diligence and to report to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Linnecke, 2016). 
 
3.5.2 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development  
     The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an organization 
in which the governments of thirty-four democratic market economies work with each other, 
and also include more than seventy non-member economies to promote economic growth and 
sustainable development (OECD, 2011). The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from conflict-affected and high-risk areas is the first example of a 
collaborative multi-stakeholder initiative on responsible supply chain management of minerals 
from conflict-affected areas, which is supported by governments (OECD, 2011). The objective 
of the guidance is to lead firms to respect human rights and avoid contributing to conflicts in 
high-risk areas through adjusting their mineral sourcing practices (OECD, 2011). This 
guidance is intended to create transparent mineral supply chains and sustainable corporate 
engagement in the mineral sector and enable countries that have conflict areas to benefit from 
their mineral resources and preventing the extraction and trade of minerals from becoming the 
cause of military conflict that result in human rights abuses and other violations. With 
additional documentary supplements on tin and tantalum, tungsten, and gold, the OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance provides firms with a complete framework to source minerals responsibly 
in order for trade in those minerals to support peace and development and not conflict in DRC 
and adjacent regions (OECD, 2011). 
 
3.5.3 Conflict-Free Smelter Program  
     Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP) is the flagship program of Conflict -Free Sourcing 
Initiative (CFSI) developed by the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI). Founded in 2004 by a group of leading electronics 
companies, the EICC is a nonprofit alliance of electronics firms committed to supporting the 
rights and well-being of labours and communities that are associated with the global electronics 
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supply chain worldwide; the GeSI is an entity that provides objective information, resources 
and best practices, aiming to achieve integrated social and environmental sustainability (EICC 
and GeSI, 2012).  
      CFSP runs in parallel to efforts by government and non-governmental groups, including 
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals and the United 
States 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act Section 1502 
(Young & Dias, 2012). The CFSP provides assurances on the sources of strategic resources 
that contain metals which are used in final electronic products. The CFSP was established as a 
response to concerns in DRC (Young & Dias, 2012). 
       CFSP focuses on the sourcing performance of smelters and refiners all over the world 
(CFSI, 2013).  Smelters and refiners are globally distributed, located in such countries as 
Australia, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Russia, United States, and others (CFSI, 
2013). As a voluntary initiative, CFSP aims to trace and audit the mineral sources of these 
smelters and refiners, in which 1an independent third party audits smelter or refiner 
procurement and tolling activities and determines if the smelter or refiner demonstrated that 
all the minerals the processed originated from conflict-free sources. CFSP uses an independent 
third-party audit to identify smelters and refiners that have systems in place to assure sourcing 
of only conflict-free materials (CFSI, 2013). The audit protocol is developed based on global 
standards including the U.S. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
conflict-affected and high-risk areas (CFSI, 2013). An audit validates that each smelter facility 
has implemented necessary due diligence procedures by first verifying the company 
management processes, then evaluating implementation of those processes with spot checks of 
those processes and their purchasing practices (CFSI, 2013). If the smelter shows sufficient 
documentation to demonstrate with reasonable confidence that the minerals they processed 
originated from conflict-free sources, then the smelter is compliant to the standards within the 
protocol and is listed as a CFSP compliant smelter (CFSI, 2013).  
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3.5.4 Other Initiatives 
      Additionally, there are other initiatives similar to the CFSP. These include efforts by the 
London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) and 
Tungsten Industry—Conflict Minerals Council (TI-CMC).  LBMA and RJC each manage 
responsible sourcing initiatives for gold supply chains (LBMA, 2011; RJC, 2009). TI-CMC is 
a conflict free initiative that provides “a method for facilitating compliance with reasonable 
country of origin inquiries within the tungsten industry while protecting confidential, sensitive, 
and proprietary information relating to members' supply chains of Tungsten” (TI-CMC, 2016). 
The LBMA comprises and represents key players and their clients in the bullion market, which 
is centered in London but which has an international footprint (LBMA, 2011). The Responsible 
Jewellery Council (RJC) is a whole-of-supply chain standards initiative for the jewellery 
supply chain. It is in its participation of organizations at every step of the value chain, each 
bringing a commitment to a responsible supply chain and implementation of responsible 
business (RJC, 2009).  The RJC Chain-of-Custody (COC) Standard builds on the RJC Code of 
Practice, aiming to address conflict issues at the chokepoint of refiners. 
      These three related responsible sourcing initiatives are all recognized by CFSP, and 
smelters that have participated in and successfully complied to these initiatives are considered 
and recorded as compliant smelters by CFSP.   
 
 
3.5.5 CFSP as a CSR Management Tool 
      Participating in CFSP implies that a firm realizes the significance of social performance in 
its social responsibility. The CFSP is a non-state voluntary program. As Young and Dias (2012) 
state, CFSP represents a mechanism of CSR in SSCM; it can be described as a CSR initiative 
that is launched by industry associations, and stakeholder groups. The CFSP aims to control 
aspects of social performance of the firms that are many tiers deep in the OEM's supply chain, 
so that the social issues of conflict mineral sourcing are far removed from the electronic sectors 
(Young & Dias, 2012).  The CFSP is distinct as a governance system. It is a CSR management 
system, which requires participants to make commitments and implement policies in a typical 
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CSR topic.   
 
 
3.6 Research Opportunities 
      Based on the current literature, the consideration of social aspects in SSCM research lags 
behind understanding of environmental aspects in supply chain. As a significant part of CSR, 
firms’ social performance is not fully addressed as environmental performance. To bridge the 
gap, this study addresses the significance of corporate social performance. According to 
previous scholars (Young & Dias, 2011; Young et al., 2014; Young, 2015), the conflict mineral 
issue has become a severe social problem in the SCM. Dodd-Frank Section 1502, and the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance have been established to deal with this social problem, and to 
contribute to responsible sourcing (CFSI, 2013; OECD, 2011). Moreover, CFSP is launched 
and tries to engage all smelters and refiners in the global metal supply chain in conflict-free 
sourcing.   
 
     The dataset represented by the CFSP and firms that have met its CSR standards provides a 
novel and comprehensive picture of management of social issues in SSCM. Specifically, in 
CFSP, there is a large number of compliant smelters and refiners that have different 
backgrounds. For example, these compliant smelters are from different countries in the world; 
some of them are from developed countries, such as the US and Germany.  However, a high 
proportion of smelters are from developing countries, such as China and Indonesia. In addition, 
these compliant smelters contain a mix of various ownership structures (private, publicly 
traded and state-owned).  In addition, these compliant smelters and refiners present a mix of 
sophistication, for example whether having or not having formal management systems such as 
ISO 14001 and ISO 9001. Furthermore, for these compliant smelters, their firm sizes are quite 
different. A high percentage of compliant smelters are tiny; some of them have only twelve 
employees, such as Indonesia private smelters; some of them are giants, such as one Chinese 
state-owned smelter that has 177,000 employees (see Appendix A).  
      Because of the diverse backgrounds of these smelters and refiners and their significant 
positions in a complex global supply chain, there is a research opportunity to determine how 
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company characteristics relate to a firm’s CSR adoption; therefore, the thesis examines a firm’s 
corporate social performance using CFSP participation as an indicator of its CSR compliance 
and thereby contributes to the current literature on SCM  
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Chapter 4 Research Objective 
4.1 Research Questions 
      This work considers the characteristics and capabilities of diverse firms that engage in 
global corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This thesis focuses on the corporate 
social performance of firms, to bridge the gap that research on the social aspect in supply chain 
management (SCM) still lags far behind that on the environmental aspect. Under this general 
objective, several research questions result: 
1. How does corporate social performance vary for firms in developed countries versus 
developing countries? 
2. How does corporate social performance vary from firms with concentrated ownership to 
firms with dispersed ownership? 
3. How does corporate social performance vary from firms with management system 
experience to firms without management system (MS) experience? 
4. How does corporate social performance vary from larger firms to smaller firms?   
 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Firm Location  
      With globalization, trading interactions frequently happen between countries. However, the 
levels of CSR development between developing and developed countries are different. 
Previous scholars indicated that firms in developed countries are more active in CSR activities 
than firms from developing countries (Dobers & Halme, 2009; UNDESA, 2007). According 
to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007), CSR agendas in 
middle and low-income countries have been less visible internationally than high-income 
countries, as the concept of CSR is more largely framed in developed countries than in 
developing countries (UNDESA, 2007). CSR is introduced through global trade by foreign 
customers, and then becomes internationalized and expands to developing countries through 
global trade, investment, and development assistance (UNDESA, 2007). Although firms in 
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developing countries are beginning to accept CSR, developing countries still lag behind 
developed countries (Dobers& Halme., 2009; UNDESA, 2007). For example, China has a 
significant role in the global economy, but environmental performance in business operations 
is still under-developed in China; sustainability in SCM is relatively novel and considered a 
kind of “innovation” in China (Zhu, Sarkis & Lai, 2012). What is more, social and 
environmental crises more often occur in developing countries (World Bank, 2005; United 
Nations Development Programme, 2006). According to scholars on Institutional Theory 
(Clappison; Minoja & Zollo, 2012; Zhu & Sarkis, 2007), the regulatory pressure is a significant 
driver for firms to implement CSR practices. It will influence whether a manager of a firm to 
adopt CSR practices. The legislation in developing countries are less powerful than CSR 
standards, compared to what in developed countries (UNDESA, 2007). For example, CSR 
reporting environmental and social issues is a significant subject of legislation in developed 
countries (UNDESA, 2007).   
       Based on the arguments presented in the literature, CSR is well-framed in developed 
countries, then accepted by other societies or businesses in developing countries through 
international trade, investment, and international development aid. CSR in developing 
countries is still under-developed and thereby is far behind developed countries.  As corporate 
social performance is a significant outcome of social performance of a firm’s undertaking of 
CSR activities (Wood, 1991; Wood, 2010), it is reasonable to assume that corporate social 
performance in developing countries similarly lags behind that in developed countries. 
Therefore, the thesis proposes that:  
Hypothesis 1a: Firm location is associated with a firm’s corporate social performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: Firms from developed countries have higher level of corporate social 
performance than firms from developing countries. 
 
 
4.2.2 Firm Ownership  
       According to the literature, the three most common types of firm ownership are privately-
owned, state-owned and publicly traded (Jermakowicz& Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; 
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UNDESA, 2007). Privately-owned firms are controlled by a small group of shareholders or 
firm members, and they do not provide or trade stocks to the public on the stock exchange 
markets (Jermakowicz, & Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). State-owned firms are identified as 
legal entities that undertake commercial activities on behalf of a government owner (Choi, Lee 
& Williams, 2011). Publicly traded firms, which are also called publicly held firms or public 
corporations, are firms whose ownership is dispersed among the public in shares of stocks, and 
they can be traded freely on the stock exchange markets and therefore have many owners 
(Jermakowicz, E. K., & Gornik-Tomaszewski, S., 2006). 
        Based on Stakeholder Theory, stakeholder pressure can be a significant driver for firms 
to adopt various sustainable practices (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Sarkis 
et al., 2011).  McWilliams and Siegel (2001) state that in a firm, major owners of a firm can 
have the power to propose and vote on a firm’s strategic decisions to invest. Thus, given that 
CSR can be seen as a kind of investment, it is reasonable that the major owners of a firm have 
a greater chance in making decisions on whether to invest in CSR or not. CSR adoption of 
firms with various ownership structures should therefore be different, and this has been 
explored in research (Oh, Chang & Martynov, 2011; Keim, 1978; Ullmann, 1985). Previous 
literature supports the argument that if a firm’s ownership is more dispersed, the CSR level 
increases (Keim, 1978; Ullmann, 1985; Oh, Chang & Martynov, 2011). Privately-owned firms 
are controlled by a small group of shareholders or firm members, usually top managers who 
have the authority to allocate firm resources. Private firm owners are usually less likely to 
pursue CSR, as it depends on the firm owner’s willingness (UNDESA, 2007; Choi et al., 2011).  
Managers owning a firm may have a negative effect on a firm’s CSR adoption (Oh, Chang & 
Martynov, 2011). Moreover, in some Asian countries, such as China, Japan and Korea, some 
managers of private firms may have a strong relationship with the founding family (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000), which may cause a negative influence on the decision-making 
process. Managers who are strongly related to the founding family may adopt policies that 
benefit the family and ignore the concerns from the other stakeholders (Oh, Chang & 
Martynov, 2011) If CSR practices do not bring profits to the families directly, the managers 
will not adopt the CSR principles.  
      State-owned firms’ profitable activities are on behalf of governments (Choi et al., 2011). 
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Because they represent the government, these firms are obliged to contribute to the community 
and protect its environment according to the laws and policies of their governments (UNDESA, 
2007; Choi et al., 2011).  However, Frye and Shleifer (1997) found that state-owned firms are 
not prepared to adopt CSR practices because the government may push firms for the benefit of 
politicians and bureaucrats. Therefore, CSR adoption by a state-owned firm largely depends 
on its government’s willingness. 
     For publicly traded firms, their shareholders have the rights to allocate resources and make 
decisions. The drivers for CSR of publicly traded firms are mainly from the shareholder’s 
interest and pressures (CIMA, 2004). Moreover, higher levels of investment from abroad might 
indicate a greater impact of CSR requirements from foreign investors (Oh, Chang & Martynov, 
2011). Ullmann (1985) also states that firms with dispersed ownership will be more likely to 
address investor’ concerns on corporate social issues and to implement social responsibility 
activities.  Facing pressures from a wide range of stakeholders, publicly traded firms are more 
likely to adopt CSR initiatives. 
      Based on the arguments of the literature, a firm’s CSR behaviour is related to its ownership 
structure. If a firm’s ownership is more dispersed, its CSR level should become higher (Keim, 
1978; Ullmann, 1985). As corporate social performance is a significant part of a firm’s CSR, 
it is reasonable that firms with more dispersed ownership have a greater level of corporate 
social performance than those with more concentrated ownership. Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Firm ownership is associated with a firm’s corporate social performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with more dispersed ownership have higher level of corporate social 
performance than firms with concentrated ownership. 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Management Systems Experience 
      A management system (MS) is a framework of procedures and processes that are used to 
ensure that an organization can achieve its objectives (Colianese & Nash, 2001). A MS should 
include the four ISO key elements of “Plan/Do/Check/Act” (PDCA) (ISO, 2001). Plan refers 
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to establishing baselines, identifying potential and actual sustainability impacts, and 
establishing goals and targets. Doing (Do) refers to implementing action plans to achieve the 
goals. Checking (Check) refers to examining and recording progress, and taking preventive 
and corrective action as needed. Acting (Act) means to evaluate the overall progress and 
systems and to make changes to the MS as needed (ISO, 2001). Typical management systems 
include a quality management system, an environmental management system, or a health and 
safety management system (Fresner & Engelhardt, 2004). Quality management systems which 
are based on ISO 9000, help firms make products of better quality, with greater efficiency and 
higher added value; they also develop greater customer satisfaction and generate more profits 
(Zwetsloot, 2003). Environmental management systems, which are based on ISO 14001, help 
firms to improve their environmental performance, and increase their eco-efficiency 
(Zwetsloot, 2003). Health and safety management systems are based on OHSAS 18001 and 
help firms create safe and healthy workplaces and improved industrial relations (Zwetsloot, 
2003). Zwetsloot (2003) states that the implementation of management systems creates 
benefits for quality environment and human health and safety. 
      Zwetsloot’s study demonstrates that the value and guidelines of the management systems 
are associated with CSR. In his study, three business principles that are relevant to both CSR 
and management systems are mentioned: (1) doing things right the first time; (2) doing the 
right things; and (3) continuous improvement and innovation. Zwetsloot continues to identify 
that the existing management systems focus on rational control (doing things right), which is 
limited in the development of CSR; the value of doing the right things is relevant to CSR and 
provides more than the current ISO management systems require. Zwetsloot also concludes 
that development of CSR is significantly related to the value of rationalities of implementing 
management systems; management systems focus on prevention, while CSR requires more 
than prevention and has a stronger focus on a firm’s innovation on improving social 
performance. 
     Many scholars use the presence of an environmental management system (EMS) as a proxy 
to test the effects on implementing CSR. (Darnall & Kim, 2012; Darnall, et al, 2008; Darnall 
& Edwards, 2006; Darnall, 2006). Firms that have ISO 14001 certification may receive 
strategic benefits in that certification to the international standard requires that firms should 
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constantly examine their internal operations, engage employees in coping with firms’ 
environmental issues, continually monitor operation progresses, and increase their knowledge 
about efficient operations (Darnall & Edwards, 2006). According to Darnall & Kim (2012), 
firms that have an EMS are more likely to adopt advanced environmental strategies that are 
built on pollution prevention principles. Darnall et al. (2008) stated, EMS adopters may have 
a greater tendency to utilize sustainable practices to reduce negative environmental impacts in 
supply chain management. Moreover, according to a perspective from RBV, organizations that 
have adopted EMSs may possess capabilities to implement sustainable practices in supply 
chain management (Darnall et al., 2008). Also, EMS may encourage some organizations to 
expand their environmental consideration from their internal operations and request their 
suppliers and customers to do the same (Darnall, 2006).  
      Based on the arguments, it is reasonable that management systems have a high correlation 
to a firm’s CSR adoption. The basic values and guidelines of a management system are critical 
to the implementation and development of CSR. In addition, firms with management systems 
are more likely to have adequate resources and capabilities to participate in CSR initiatives.  
As corporate social performance is also significant part of CSR besides environmental 
performance, it is reasonable that firms with MS experience have a greater level of corporate 
social performance than those with MS experience. Therefore, this thesis proposes that: 
Hypothesis 3a: Managements system (MS) experience is associated with a firm’s corporate 
social performance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with MS experience higher level of corporate social performance than 
firms without MS experience. 
 
 
4.2.4 Firm Size 
        Scholars (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Edwards, Marginson, Edwards, Ferner & Tregaskis, 
2007; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Ciliberti, Pontrandolfo & Scozzi, 2008) have shown that firm 
size is a significant factor that will impact a firm’s CSR performance. According to scholars 
on RBV (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006; Barney, 1991; Zhu et al., 2008; Bianchi & Noci, 1998), 
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larger firms have more resources and capacities to implement CSR practices and have more 
social responsibilities than smaller firms. Zhu et al. (2008) state that differences among 
organization sizes influence their sustainability strategies implementation. Barney (1991) 
stated that larger firms usually have more financial resources to cope with environmental issues 
than smaller firms. Moreover, larger firms will face more pressures from legislation and 
stakeholders because of their own economic strength and complicated relationship in the 
market, and are therefore expected to reach higher standards of CSR than smaller firms (Russo 
& Fouts, 1997).  
     Unlike larger firms, lack of resources could be a major barrier for CSR implementation of 
smaller firms (Bianchi & Noci, 1998). Bianchi & Noci (1998) revealed that smaller firms are 
less likely to invest in environmental and other sustainability practices that have long-term 
strategic benefits, because resources, such as labour, time and costs, are admittedly more 
constrained (Bianchi & Noci, 1998). Because of having limited resources, it is impossible for 
smaller firms to invest much in sustainability practices that can bring strategic benefits in the 
long run.  Nevertheless, according to Besser (1999), smaller firms prefer attracting customers 
and employees from the local community; a good reputation is meaningful to small business 
success and smaller firms are likely to be more responsive to stakeholder concerns to build a 
positive public image and maintain a good relationship with the local community.  
      Based on the arguments of previous scholars, it is reasonable that larger firms are more 
likely to have higher CSR adoption rates than smaller firms. Smaller firms are more likely to 
be responsive to stakeholders’ concerns than larger firms for a better reputation, but they do 
not have as much resources as large firms to support CSR practices.  As corporate social 
performance is a significant part of CSR, it is reasonable that larger firms have the resources 
and capability to improve both their environmental performance and social performance. 
Therefore, this thesis proposes that:  
Hypothesis 4a: Firm size is associated with a firm’s corporate social performance. 
Hypothesis 4b: Larger firms have higher level of corporate social performance than smaller 
firms. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology 
      The general approach used throughout this study is statistical analysis. The data analysis 
aims to correlate CSR behaviour with independent variables that describe firms.  In this study, 
CFSP participation is utilized as a measurement of corporate social performance.  As 
mentioned in Section 3.5.5, CFSP represents a mechanism of CSR and supply-chain 
sustainability management (Young & Dias, 2012), and participating in CFSP requires a firm to 
make commitments and implement policies in mineral sourcing. Generally, gold is the odd one 
out because it is less currently covered by the certification programs, whereas the 3Ts have 
already been largely covered by CFSP. For tantalum, under CFSP, about 99% of the reported 
tantalum mineral produced was covered by 2014 (Achebe, 2016).  It is clear that most tantalum 
smelters have proven that their sources are conflict-free. For tin, by the end of 2014, 40 % of 
known tin producers participated in the CFSP (Young, 2015).  For tungsten, which was the last 
of the all 3TG sectors to participate in the CFSP, there are only about fifty smelters worldwide. 
Of these, twenty-nine of the major companies (including most of the Western producers) in 
tungsten industry are participating as of 2014 in the CFSP (Young, 2015). Non-engaged firms 
are mostly small and Chinese based. For gold, the gold sector has the greatest number of firms 
compliant to the CFSP, with about eighty of the one hundred and fifty firms identified (Young, 
2015), including most major refiners worldwide. 
 
      The datasets that are used in this study describe two hundred and fifteen (215) 3TG smelters 
and refiners that are compliant with the CFSP by April 2016. The reason for only including 
this group is the data of these firms were readily available on a consistent basis. Dependent 
variables and independent variables are defined in this chapter. The dependent variables 
include Commitment Group and implementation period. Independent variables are firm 
location, firm ownership, management system (MS) experience and firm size. The data of 
dependent variables collected are from several major conflict free programs, including CFSI, 
LBMA, RJC and TI-CMC; the data of independent variables are collected from company 
website, annual reports, and Google Finance.  
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Table 1. Summary of Facilities in Research Sample 
 Tin Tantalum Tungsten Gold Total  
N 59 46 29 81 215 
Developed Countries 10 23 10 58 101 
Developing Countries 49 23 19 23 114 
Private 52 33 18 46 149 
Publicly Traded 6 10 6 29 51 
State-owned 1 3 5 6 15 
MS 18 36 22 42 118 
Non-MS 41 10 7 39 97 
 
Table 1 displays the number of firms with different characteristics for each metal and in total.  
The two hundred and fifteen compliant smelters are of various backgrounds, including firms 
from different countries (developing countries or developed countries) with different 
ownership structures (private, publicly traded or state-owned), and whether the firm implement 
MS or not.  
 
5.1 Measures 
       In this section, dependent variables and independent variables that are used in the data 
analysis are introduced. A discussion of the variables and rationale for choosing these variables 
to test the hypotheses is presented. In addition, data sources where information is collected are 
described in detail. Finally, the data analysis to test the hypotheses in this study is described.  
5.1.1 Dependent Variables 
 
Figure 2 displays how a smelter or refiner becomes compliant with the CFSP. To become a 
compliant smelter or refiner, the decision-makers of a smelter or refiner has to first commit to 
follow the protocol standards that are required by CFSP. However, commitment is just the first 
step of adopting the CFSP. It is also significant for a smelter to implement the standards that it 
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has committed to modify their sourcing practices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Process from Non-compliance to Compliance of a Firm in CFSP 
 
      There are three important dates for this process, the identification date, active date and 
initial compliance date.  
 Identification date is the first date that a firm is identified as a smelter by the CFSP. 
After the firms are identified, they are contacted and encouraged to participate in the 
CFSP.   
 Active date is the date when a firm actively chose to participate in the CFSP. According 
to the CFSI (2013), a smelter on the active list has committed to follow CFSP standards 
and take a CFSP audit. It is also the date when a firm is added to a CFSP Active Smelters 
& Refiners list on the CFSI’s website, after signing the Agreement on the Exchange of 
Confidential Information (AECI) (CFSI, 2013).  Smelters on the Active Smelters & 
Refiners list are engaged in the program but not yet compliant.   
 Initial compliance date is the first date for which the CFSP has concluded an eligible 
entity that is considered compliant with the audit protocols.  For the 3Ts, a compliant 
smelter is a firm that has been audited and found compliant with the relevant CFSP 
protocol. For gold smelters, some of them are already compliant in other similar 
programs, such as LBMA and RJC. The initial compliance date for these gold smelters 
is the date when their programs are recognized by CFSP and the firm is added to the 
compliant smelter list.  
      A first idea of this study was to look at identification date as the start point and calculate 
the period from identification date to active date. However, this was complicated as there was 
few satisfactory results or clean data. Therefore, the active date and initial compliance are 
Identification Date  Active Date Initial Compliance Date 
Commitment Period Implementation Period 
Compliance Non-compliance 
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adopted at last. Based on active date and initial compliance date, two dependent variables 
describe the time taken for a firm to participate in the CFSP: commitment group and 
implementation period. 
5.1.1.1 Commitment Group         
     The commitment group indicates how quickly a smelter has decided to participate in the 
CFSP. It is based on the active date of a smelter in the dataset. The commitment group is chosen 
to present how a smelter reacts to being compliant with CFSP protocols and fulfills its social 
responsibility. During this period, the firm will be contacted by CFSP and its decision-makers 
finally decide to accept the CFSP protocol standards. The commitment group judges if a 
smelter or refiner commits to CFSP protocol earlier or later. Importantly, the groupings are 
defined for each metal.  
      Rogers (2010) produced a theory of the adoption of innovations among individuals and 
organizations, which revealed that the passage of time is necessary for innovations to be 
adopted; they are rarely adopted at the same time. He also discussed that diffusion of 
innovation signifies a group phenomenon, indicating how an innovation spreads (Rogers, 
2010). Based on the theory proposed by Rogers, the two hundred and fifteen CFSP compliant 
smelters are grouped into categories of leader, follower, middle majority, or laggard, depending 
on when the decision-makers of a smelter commit to following protocol standards according 
to the CFSP.  Leaders are smelters that adopt the CFSP at the earliest. The followers are 
smelters just following early adopters; they are thoughtful when deciding whether to accept 
CFSP standards. Middle majority are smelters that commit to the CFSP protocol standards only 
when participating in the CFSP becomes main stream.  The laggards refer to the smelters that 
only accept the CFSP protocols after the conflict-free sourcing has been adopted by most 
smelters and they are late adopters.  Specifically, smelters and refiners for each of the metals 
are grouped in the following figures, and the red lines are used to mark the commitment group 
(Figure 3, Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6).   
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Figure 3. Active Dates of Gold Smelters and Refiners (n=81) 
 
       Figure 3 displays the commitment group of the gold smelters and refiners. The initial 
protocol publish date for gold was 2011/09/11 (CFSI, 2013). There is a set of gold smelters 
and refiners becoming active in 2011. Of all the seven leaders, there are six smelters from 
developed countries while there is only one from a developing country. As they are the earliest 
CFSP protocol adopters, these smelters are considered the leaders of gold.  After the leaders 
became active a number of smelters followed, becoming active in 2012 and 2013. They are 
considered followers.  In 2014 and in the first half of 2015, there was a large number of gold 
smelters that became active, which is the majority of the gold smelters. These smelters are 
considered as the middle majority of the total. In the second half of 2015, a small number of 
gold smelters became active, which are two Russian gold refiners. As they are the latest gold 
smelters to become active, they are considered the laggards. The dataset suggests that some 
gold smelters are not in the CFSP originally, but they have already become compliant smelters 
of other programs (LBMA, RJC) before the CFSP recognized these programs (Appendix B). 
These gold smelters are the quickest CFSP adopters because they have already passed a third 
party audit. 
 
Leaders Followers Middle Majority Laggards 
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Figure 4. Active Date of Tungsten Smelters and Refiners (n=29) 
      Figure 4 displays the commitment group of tungsten smelters and refiners. The initial 
protocol publish date for tungsten is 2011/08/09 (CFSI, 2013).  In the second half of 2010, 
there were three tungsten smelters that became active, which are the earliest of them all. These 
smelters are considered the leaders of tungsten smelters.  The three tungsten leaders are all 
owned by HC. Starck Group.   Two years after the leaders became active, a set of tungsten 
smelters that followed the leaders in 2013. These smelters are considered the followers of the 
tungsten leaders. In 2014 and the first half of 2015, a large number of tungsten smelters became 
active, which is the majority of tungsten smelters. Thus, they are considered the middle 
majority. There are more Chinese tungsten smelters than non-Chinese smelters among 
followers and middle majority. In the second half of 2015, there was only one smelter, Niagara 
Refining LLC, that became active, which was the most recent tungsten smelters. Therefore, it 
is listed as the laggard of tungsten.  
 
 
 
Leaders Followers Middle Majority Laggards 
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Figure 5. Active Date of Tin Smelters and Refiners (n=59) 
 
       Figure 5 displays the commitment group of tin smelters and refiners. The initial protocol 
publish date for tin was 2011/09/15 (CFSI, 2013). In the second half of 2011 and the first half 
of 2012, a small group of tin smelters became active. They are considered the leaders, as they 
are the earliest of all tin smelters. Although most tin smelters are from Indonesia, all leaders 
are non-Indonesia smelters.  In the second half of 2012 and the first half of 2013, a tiny group 
of smelters followed the leaders. They are considered the followers of the tin leaders.  From 
the second half of 2013 to the first half of 2015, a large number of smelters became active, and 
are considered the middle majority.  There are more Indonesia smelters than non-Indonesian 
smelters among the followers and middle majority.  In the second half of 2015, six smelters 
became active, which are the most recent tin smelters. All these smelters are private firms from 
Indonesia and are considered the laggards of tin.  
 
Laggards Leaders Followers Middle Majority 
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Figure 6. Active Date of Tantalum Smelters and Refiners (n=46) 
      Figure 6 displays the commitment group of the tantalum smelters and refiners. The initial 
protocol publication date for tantalum was 2011/01/15 (CFSI, 2013). In the second half of 
2010, a large group of smelters became active, which are the earliest and are considered the 
leaders in tantalum.  Among the leaders, there are six smelters owned by HC Starck, and two 
smelters owned by Global Advanced Metals.  From 2011 to 2012, another group of smelters 
followed the leaders; they are identified as the followers because they became active after the 
leaders. Most of these followers are from developed countries. From 2013 to 2014, a group of 
smelters became active after the followers and are considered the middle majority; most of 
them are from China and several smelters are from the US. In 2015, four smelters became 
active after most smelters, including two from China, one from Brazil and ne from the US. 
These smelters are considered the laggards as they the most recent tantalum smelters to become 
active in the CFSP.   
 
 
 
 
Leaders Followers Middle Majority Laggards 
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5.1.1.2 Implementation Period 
       Implementation period refers to the duration from active date to initial compliance date 
(Figure 2). The duration of the implementation period is chosen to present how long a smelter 
or refiner implements the standards within the CFSP protocol that it has committed to adopt. 
If the length of implementation period is short, it means that a smelter or refiner quickly 
implemented the necessary CFSP systems and practices to follow the standards, so that no 
audits are of fixed length to review. This smelter is considered a quick CFSP implementer, and 
thus, has a better CSR implementation because it takes the firm less time to adopt relevant 
practices to follow the standards. 
      In the dataset, some gold smelters and refiners are not in the CFSP originally, but they have 
previously become compliant in other responsible sourcing initiatives (LBMA, RJC) before 
the CFSP recognized them (Appendix B).  In this situation, the active dates of these gold 
smelters are recorded as same as initial compliance dates by the CFSP.  In this study, the 
implementation period of these gold smelters is recorded as one day in the database (Appendix 
B). The reason is that these gold smelters are the quickest CFSP adopters of all, as they have 
already passed a third-party audit in their gold responsible sourcing initiatives. 
 
 
5.1.2 Independent Variables  
      There are four independent variables listed in this study to measure the correlation with the 
commitment group and the implementation period: firm location, firm ownership, MS 
experience, and firm size. In this section, the measurement of each independent variable and 
the rationale for choosing are described in detail.  
5.1.2.1 Firm Location  
      The country in which a firm is based is evaluated in this study. Firms are classified as being 
from developing countries or developed countries. According to the UNDP (2015), developed 
countries are countries that have a Human Development Index (HDI) of higher than or equal 
to 0.8, while the HDI of a developing country is under 0.8 (UNDP, 2015). The reason for 
  36 
choosing the UNDP’s classification is that the HDI is a composite index including life 
expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators, thus HDI provides a measure that is 
relatively objective and comprehensive, rather than the GDP (UNDP, 2015). A country scores 
a higher HDI when the life expectancy at birth is longer, the education period is longer, and 
the income per capita is higher. As mentioned by some scholars (UNDESA, 2007; Dobers & 
Halme, 2009), location, whether in developed or developing countries is a significant factor 
that may impact a firm’s CSR adoption because the regulation and market systems in a 
developed or developing country can push the firm to pursue CSR activities or not. 
       Among 3TG smelters, most of them have a single facility at an operating location, which 
is assumed to be their management location. However, some smelters have more than one 
facility or operate under a business group, such as HC Starck and Xiamen Tungsten Co. In 
these cases, the firm location is identified as the country location of the headquarters of the 
business group. The reason is that as a business group, the firm headquarter is the decision-
maker that chooses to participate in the CFSP for its different facilities, and its facilities should 
follow the orders from their headquarters.  This is a fundamental issue that needs to be noted 
when recording the location of different smelters. 
     When searching for a smelter’s country location, the locations of corporate headquarters 
are adopted as the firm location of the smelters and refiners. Therefore, it is necessary to figure 
out the difference between the facility location and the headquarter location, in case that the 
facility location instead of its headquarter location is adopted incorrectly, which is a potential 
risk.  
 
5.1.2.2 Firm Ownership 
      Firm ownership in this study is categorized as private, publicly traded, and state-owned 
firms, as they have different levels in their structures. In the current literatures, firm ownership 
plays a significant role in deciding a firm’s CSR behaviour. Based on the literature (Claessens 
et al. 2000; UNDESA, 2007; Choi et al., 2011), the concentration of the ownership structure 
impacts a firm’s CSR adoption; firms with a more dispersed ownership structure have a better 
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CSR adoption than firms with more concentrated ownership structure because they face more 
pressures from stakeholders.  
  
 A private firm is owned either by non-governmental organizations, by a small number 
of shareholders, or by company members who do not offer or trade its company stock 
to the general public on the market exchanges (Jermakowicz& Gornik-Tomaszewski, 
2006). In the case of 3TG smelters, it is considered that many of the firms are small 
privately owned companies that appear to owner managed. Some are a part of a family 
business or owned by a small business-person, especially some Indonesian tin smelters 
in the dataset (Appendix A).  
 
 A publicly traded firm also called a publicly held company or a public corporation is 
defined as a “corporation whose ownership is dispersed among the general public in 
many shares of stock, which can be freely traded on the stock markets” (Jermakowicz& 
Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006). The examples of publicly traded firms in the database are 
Kemet Corporation of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Xiamen Tungsten 
Co. of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) in the dataset (Appendix A).   
 
 A state-owned enterprise is defined as a legal entity that undertakes commercial 
activities on behalf of an owner government (Choi et al., 2011). In the population 
considered, this includes companies that may have more than ten thousand employees, 
such as China Minmetals Non-ferrous Metals Holding Co., Ltd. and Jiangxi Rare 
Metals Tungsten Holding Group Co., Ltd in the data sample.  Other state-owned firms 
include the Malaysia Central Bank and the Canadian Royal Mint (Appendix A). 
 
      There are two other formats of ownership structures existing in the sample smelters and 
refiners, which are joint-venture and cooperative.  
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 The joint-venture firms are identified in the analysis; however, an attempt is made to 
appropriately categorize joint ventures into one of the main four categories. If the 
owners are all private companies, the joint-venture firm is categorized as a private firm. 
However, the owners of a joint-venture firm could consist of a private firm and a state-
owned firm or a publicly traded firm, which is complicated. The way to categorize the 
ownership of joint venture firms in our study is to treat this ownership of kind of joint-
venture firm as the ownership of the owner company that has the most shares of the 
joint-venture firm. The reason is that in a joint-venture company, the decision is 
dependent on the party who holds the largest portion of shares (Osland & Cavusgil, 
1996); the decisions on choosing to participate in CSR initiatives are mainly related to 
the company who is the biggest shareholder. Therefore, the ownership of joint-venture 
smelters in the study will be treated as the ownership of the firm who holds the majority 
shares.    
 
 Another exception is a cooperative firm, which is Coopermetal in the dataset.  This 
kind of firm is owned, controlled, and operated by a group of members for their own 
benefit (Skurnik, 2002). In this kind of ownership structure, each member contributes 
equity capital, and shares in the control of the firm on the basis of one-member, one-
vote, which is not based on each equity contribution (Skurnik, 2002). It is difficult to 
measure a cooperative firm’s internal management because all the members have the 
right to make decision.  To solve the problem, it is necessary to take a further look at 
the members of a cooperative corporation; if there are more members who have a 
similar ownership, the ownership of the cooperative firm in the dataset is recorded as 
the ownership of its majority members.   
5.1.2.3 Management System Experience 
      This independent variable considers whether a firm has previous management system (MS) 
experience. A MS is the framework of processes that are used to ensure that an organization 
can fulfill all tasks required to achieve its objectives (Colianese and Nash, 2001). Whether a 
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firm has a management system experience is measured by the presence of formal ISO or similar 
certifications. In the dataset, of all two hundred and fifteen smelters, there are one hundred and 
eighteen having management systems.  
     The management systems used by smelters include: ISO 14001, ISO 9001 and OHSAS 
18001. Zwetsloot’s study (2013) found that the development of CSR is significantly related to 
the value of management system. Some scholars (Darnall et al, 2008; Darnall et al., 2006; 
Klassen & McLaughlin, 2001; Schmidheiny, 1992) state that firms that have adopted a 
management system, such as the environment management system (EMS), may their focus 
beyond their organizational boundaries and possess capabilities that are complementary to 
CSR initiatives. Thus, a firm that has prior management system experience is more likely to 
adapted and manage the CSR programs. Therefore, it is considered that a firm’s management 
system experience impacts a company’s participation in CFSP.    
       To gather information on the MS experience, ISO or similar MS certifications should be 
searched; however, it is uncertain whether all firms with a management system certification 
really display the certification on their websites or annual reports.  Moreover, the weakness of 
this identification needs to be raised. ISO management systems or similar certified MSs are 
used to indicate whether a smelter has MS experience in this study. This identification has its 
limitation because firms are identified as having management systems according to ISO or 
similar management system certifications. However, the best that the study can do is to check 
all necessary sources to collect information of all smelters’ MS certifications. 
 
5.1.2.3 Firm Size 
      Definitions of firm size that are provided by many countries in the world all mention that 
the number of employees is a significant indicator to measure firm size (Industry Canada, 2013; 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2012). The definitions of firm sizes vary in 
different countries throughout the world.  According to Industry Canada (Industry Canada, 
2013), in Canada, the small, medium and large firms are divided based on the number of 
employees. A small firm has less than 100 employees; a medium firm has 100 to 500 
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employees; a large firm has more than 500 employees. European Commission defines small 
enterprises as having up to 50 employees; medium-sized enterprises have up to 250 employees, 
while large firms have more than 250 employees (European Commission, 2003). According to 
the definition provided by the US, the criteria for categorizing firm sizes is based on industry, 
ownership structure, revenue, and the number of employees (United States Small Business 
Administration, 2012). The US generally uses the same threshold of fewer than 10 employees 
for small offices (United States Small Business Administration, 2012). In Australia’s definition 
of firm size, a small and medium-sized enterprise has 199 or fewer employees; a small business 
has 5 to 19 employee numbers; medium firm have 20 to 199 employees, a large firm 200 or 
more than 200 employees (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001). Therefore, there is no doubt 
that the categorization of firm size is based on the employee numbers according to the 
definitions provided by different countries. Becker-Blease, Kaen, Etebari and Baumann (2010) 
also state that number of employee is better than profitability in measuring firm size. The 
reason for using the number of employees to measure firm size is that coordination and control 
costs are likely to be highly correlated with both value added per employee and the number of 
employees (Becker-Blease et al., 2010). Therefore, the number of employees could be 
representative of the firm size. However, the log of the number of employees will be used in 
this study in order to account for the fact that the median number of employees for firms is 
considerably less than the mean (Becker-Blease et al., 2010) because the number of employees 
of the 215 samples varies from 12 to 177000.  
 
       In some cases, information on the number of employees was not available. For example, 
for many small Indonesian tin smelters, they do not provide the information for their employee 
numbers.  To fill the blank of the number of employees of these smelters, the missing data were 
estimated based on their annual production capacity, which is a value that most firms publish. 
The larger a smelter’s annual production volume, the more employees they will have.  To fill 
the data gap on the number of employees of Indonesian tin smelters, the regression analysis 
was done to test the relationship between the number of employees and the annual production 
volume (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Number of Employees Corresponds to Production Capacity for Small Indonesian Tin 
Smelters 
 
       Figure 7 displays the regression relationship between the number of employees and 
production volume.  According to Figure 7, it is obvious that there is a strong positive 
relationship between the number of employees and the annual production volume of Indonesia 
tin smelters. Therefore, the evidence supports the assumption that the production volume can 
reflect the number of employees of these smelters. Moreover, by using the function from the 
regression analysis, the missing information of number of employees of the Indonesian tin 
smelters can be estimated for firms for which other data were missing.  
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Table 2 Structure of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Construct Indicator  Operationalization Rationale 
Dependent Variable 
Commitment 
Group 
CSR commitment Active Date Coded 1=leaders, 
2=followers, 3= 
middle majority, 4= 
laggards 
Active Date could 
reflect a firm’s early 
or late CFSP 
commitment 
Implementation 
Period 
CSR implementation Difference 
between Active 
date and Initial 
Compliance 
Date 
Initial Compliance 
Date-Active Date 
(measured 
continually in units of 
days) 
Implementation Period 
could reflect a firm’s 
slow or quick CFSP 
implementation 
 
Independent Variable       
Firm Location Developed and 
developing country 
Developing or 
developed 
country of 
headquarter 
Coded 0=developing 
countries, 
1=developed 
countries 
Headquarter is the 
decision maker for its 
facilities to choose to 
participate in the 
CFSP  
Ownership Concentrated or 
dispersed ownership  
Private, publicly 
traded and state-
owned 
Coded 1=private, 2= 
publicly traded, 
3=state-owned 
These three ownership 
structures typically 
represent the 
concentrated (state-
owned and private-
owned) or dispersed 
ownership structure 
(publicly traded) 
Management 
System (MS) 
Experience  
Firm’s experience on 
MS Adoption 
ISO and similar 
MS certifications 
Coded 0=no, 1=yes ISO system is a 
certification, having an 
ISO or similar system 
certification implies 
that a firm has the 
management 
experience as CFSP is 
a type of CSR 
management tool 
Firm Size Firm Resources Number of 
Employees  
The log of number of 
employees 
Smelters and refiners 
are labour intensive, 
thus the number of 
employees could 
indicate their sources 
availability 
 
       
      Table 2 displays the brief summaries of the construct, indicator, operationalization and 
rationale for choosing each dependent variable and independent variable. It describes the 
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information for the dependent and independent variables metrics that are discussed in Section 
5.1. In addition, Table 2 provides the dummy code for some variables.  The classification of 
information is an important step towards preparation of data for computer processing with 
statistical software. According to Table 2, the nominal variables of the commitment group, 
firm location, ownership and MS are coded in this study, to transfer the data for the 
commitment group, firm location, firm ownership and management system (MS) experience 
into the forms that can be understood by SPSS, the software used for statistical analysis. 
Therefore, SPSS can easily process these data. As previously mentioned, the two hundred and 
fifteen CFSP compliant smelters are categorized into four commitment groups based on their 
active date: leaders, followers, middle majority and laggards. In this study, the four groups are 
coded as 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. If the number of commitment group is larger, it means that 
a smelter or a refiner becomes active later. In addition, for firm location, smelters and refiners 
are coded as 0 (developing country) and 1 (developed country). Lastly, as these smelters have 
diverse backgrounds on MS experience, they are coded as 1 (MS certification), and 0 (no MS 
certification). Unlike the nominal variables, the implementation period is measured as a 
continuous variable and it is measured in days.  
 
 
5.2 Data Sources  
       The study period of the research is from 2010 (the beginning of the CFSP) to April 2016, 
and the program is still ongoing as more smelters are participating, which is a constraint of this 
study. Data sources for dependent variables included information from four responsible 
sourcing initiatives, CFSI, LBMA, RJC and TI-CMC.  CFSP consolidates the list. Sources of 
data on independent variables include company websites, annual reports and Google Finance, 
where the information is about the firm location, the number of employees, the firm ownership, 
and the MS experience.  
 
 Currently, there are over three hundred companies from seven different industries that 
participate in the CFSI. The CFSI manages to a range of tools and resources including 
the Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP), the Reasonable Country of Origin Inquiry 
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(RCOI) data, and a range of guidance documents on conflict minerals sourcing (CFSI, 
2013). The CFSI also operates regular workshops on conflict minerals issues and assists 
in policy development and debates with leading civil society organizations and 
governments (CFSI, 2013). As the flagship program of the CFSI, the CFSP takes a 
unique approach to helping firms make informed choices on mineral sourcing in their 
supply chains. CFSP has a list of 3TG smelters that meet the standards of the audit 
around the world (CFSI, 2014), which is posted on its website. Information on the 
active date and the initial compliance date of the CFSP compliant smelters is collected 
from its posted website list.  
 
 
 The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) comprises and represents key 
players including the majority of the gold-holding central banks, private sector 
investors, mining companies, producers, refiners and fabricators and their clients in the 
bullion market, which is centered in London, England but which has an international 
footprint (LBMA, 2011). Information on the active date and the initial compliance date 
of compliant gold smelters and refiners can be sourced from the website of LBMA.  
 
 The Responsible Jewellery Council (RJC) is a whole-of-supply chain standards 
initiative for the jeweler supply chain, from mine to retail (Responsible Jewellery 
Council, 2009). It is unique in its participation of organizations at every step in the 
value chain, each bringing a commitment to a responsible supply chain and 
implementation of responsible business (Responsible Jewellery Council, 2009). 
Information on the active date and initial compliance date of gold compliance smelters 
can be accessed on the website of RJC.  
 
 Tungsten Industry—Conflict Minerals Council (TI-CMC) is an organization that 
provides a method for facilitating compliance with reasonable country of origin 
inquiries within the tungsten industry while protecting confidential, sensitive, and 
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proprietary information relating to members' supply chains of Tungsten (TI-CMC, 
2016). Information on the tungsten smelters and their active dates and firm locations 
are provided from the website of TI-CMC.  
 
      Other sources for information on independent variables, such as the firm location, the firm 
ownership, the firm Size and the MS Experience, is found on the company website, annual 
report, and Google Finance. 
 Company Website and Annual Reports provide the location of the company’s 
headquarters, information about the firm ownership, employee numbers, and MS 
experience.  
 Google Finance is a website launched by Google. The features of Google Finance 
include the stock markets, news, stock screener, and portfolios of publicly traded firms. 
Google Finance is a data source because it has portfolios of the publicly traded smelting 
firms. From Google Finance, information about the country of headquarters and the 
number of employees of publicly traded firms are collected in the dataset. 
 
 
 
5.3 Data Analysis 
       In this study, the linear regression analysis is used to analyze the data on the smelting 
firms. The purpose of using regression is to estimate the relationship between the dependent 
variables and independent variables. It helps one understand how the typical value of the 
dependent variable changes when any one of the independent variables is modified. This paper 
considers two hundred and fifteen 3TG smelting firms which are compliant in the CFSP.  
 
        Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables, Commitment Group, 
Implementation Period, Firm Location, Ownership, MS Experience, Number of Employees 
and the log of the number of employees. Table 3 lists the minimum, maximum, mean and 
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standard deviation of these dependent variables and independent variables. 
 
  
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Commitment Group 1 4 2.58 0.804 
Implementation Period 1 1,670 192 265 
Firm Location 
Ownership 
0 
1 
1 
3 
0.470 
1.38 
0.500 
0.613 
MS Experienced 0 1 0.550 0.499 
Number of Employees 12 177,000 3,430 13,500 
Ln (number of employees) 2.48 12.1 6.21 1.85 
 
 
      The SPSS statistics software is used for the data analysis in this study. The p-value (2-
tailed) of the correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variables 
indicates as the results. The p-value for the independent variable explains whether the 
independent variable has a statistically significant predictive capability.  If the p-value is less 
than 0.05, it means that the result is over a 95% significance level, which indicates that the 
independent variable has a strong relationship with the dependent variable.  
 The coefficient between the independent variable and the dependent variable also indicates 
the results. If the coefficient is positive, the independent variable has a positive impact on the 
dependent variable; if coefficient is negative, the independent variable has a negative effect on 
the dependent variable.  
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Chapter 6 Results 
        This chapter presents the findings obtained from the linear regression analysis of the two 
hundred and fifteen CFSP compliant firms. The results on both the commitment group and the 
implementation period are described in this chapter. The significance value (p-value) and 
coefficients are used to interpret the results.  
       Table 4 displays the correlations between the two dependent variables, the commitment 
group and the implementation period. The results illustrate that commitment group has a strong 
negative relationship with the implementation period (coefficient=-0.252, p<0.01). It means 
that later adopters are more likely to use less time to implement CFSP the audit protocol 
practices than earlier adopters.  
 
Table 4. Regression Results on Dependent Variables 
 Implementation Period 
 
Commitment Group 
 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
    -0.252** 
p<0.01 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), p<0.01 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), p< 0.05 
 
     As a test, the study did run statistics on each of the four groups of metals separately. 
However, the results did not differ significantly from the aggregated results, and the statistics 
are stronger when aggregated because there are more sample numbers in those runs. Therefore, 
the decision was made to keep 3TG all together in the results. 
 
 
6.1 Commitment Group  
     Table 5 displays the correlations between the independent variables and the commitment 
group. From Table 5, the commitment Group has a strong relationship with the firm location, 
as the correlation is at the 0.01 level (p<0.01).  In addition, as the coefficient is negative 
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(coefficient= -0.235), firm location has a negative effect on the commitment group, which 
means that the smelters in developed countries are more likely to be active earlier than those 
in developing countries. Therefore, the results on firm location provide support for Hypothesis 
1a and 1b. 
      Table 5. Regression Results on Independent Variables 
 Dependent Variable                                     Commitment Group                              Implementation Period 
Independent Variable 
Firm Location 
 
Coefficient 
p- value  
 
-0.235** 
p<0.01 
 
-0.088 
0.197 
 
Firm Ownership 
 
Coefficient  
p- value 
 
-0.111 
0.105 
 
-0.121 
0.078 
 
MS Experience 
 
Coefficient 
p- value 
 
-0.303** 
p<0.01 
 
0.010 
0.888 
 
Firm Size  
 
Coefficient 
p-value 
 
-0.258** 
p<0.01 
 
0.082 
0.232 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), p<0.01 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), p<0.05 
             
 
     For the correlation between the firm ownership and commitment group, the results show 
that the commitment group does not have a relationship with firm ownership, as the correlation 
is insignificant (p>0.05). Therefore, the results fail to provide support for Hypothesis 2a and 
2b. 
  The results also show that the commitment group has a strong relationship with a firm’s 
MS experience, as the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (p<0.01). In addition, the MS 
experience also has a negative effect on the commitment group (coefficient= -0.303), which 
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means that firms with MS experience commit to the CFSP protocol standards earlier than those 
without MS experience. Therefore, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3a and 3b.  
     According to Table 5, the results indicate that the firm size has a strong relationship with 
the commitment group as the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (p=0.232). Besides, 
firm size has a negative effect on Commitment Group (coefficient= -0.258), which means that 
larger firms are more likely to commit to the CFSP standards earlier than smaller firms. 
Therefore, the results provide support for Hypothesis 4a and 4b.  
 
 
6.2 Implementation Period 
       Table 2 also displays the correlations between the implementation period and the 
independent variables of firm location, ownership, MS experience and firm size.  According 
to the results in Table 5, firm location does not have a relationship with the implementation 
period because it has less than a 95% significance level (p=0.197).  The results in Table 2 
indicates that firm ownership structure does not have a relationship with the implementation 
period because it has less than a 95% significance level (p=0.078).  The results also show that 
a firm’s MS experience does not have a relationship with the implementation period because 
it has less than a 95% significance level (p=0.888).  The results show that the firm size does 
not have a relationship with the implementation period because it has less than a 95% 
significance level (p>0.05). Therefore, the results on the correlation between the 
implementation period and the independent variables fail to provide support for Hypothesis 
1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion  
      In this chapter, a number of insights are drawn based on the results from the correlation 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables, discussion, implications for 
theories and practices, and contribution to the literatures are presented in this chapter. In 
addition, limitations of the study are described.  
       
 
7.1 Commitment and Firm Characteristics 
7.1.1 Developing Countries vs. Developed Countries 
     Based on the results, firms from developed countries have a higher level of commitment to 
corporate social performance than firms from developing countries. This result aligns with the 
finding of previous scholars. Dobers and Halme (2009) state that CSR practices are largely 
framed in rich countries. CSR in developing countries is still far behind developed countries 
(UNDESA, 2007). Sustainability in SCM is still relatively novel and considered an innovation 
in developing countries, such as China (Zhu et al., 2012).  The concept of CSR evolved from 
practices and expectations in developed countries, so that firms are more likely to be familiar 
with how to participate in CSR initiatives. For the CFSP most early adopters are from 
developed countries (Appendix A). As Wood (1991) states, corporate social performance 
constitutes the outcome of social performance of a firm’s participation in CSR initiatives, in 
general, the results on the relationship between firm location and commitment in corporate 
social performance provide support for the findings of previous scholars 
 
7.1.2 Dispersed Ownership Structure vs. Concentrated Ownership Structure  
      Based on the results, firm ownership does not have a strong relationship with a firm’s 
commitment to corporate social performance. The result is not consistent with the findings of 
previous scholars that if the ownership structure of a firm is more dispersed, it is more likely 
to have a higher level of CSR than a firm with more concentrated ownership structure (Keim, 
1978; Ullmann, 1985; Oh, Chang & Martynov, 2011).  
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      A possible reason is that the sample of firms may not be typical of what have been 
considered previously. As stated in Chapter 5, the ownership structures are categorized as 
private, publicly traded and state-owned.  However, among the samples, the same ownership 
structure may be different in various countries, which can affect the CSR initiatives adoption. 
In the dataset, there are quite a number of tiny Indonesian tin smelters. These firms are totally 
controlled by a family, including all decision-making. Therefore, as the data sample does not 
perfectly match what is expected, the bias exists as this part of the sample and may skew the 
results. 
 
 
7.1.3 MS Experience vs. No-MS Experience 
       For management system (MS) experience, the results indicate that firms with prior MS 
experience hive higher level of commitment in corporate social performance than those 
without MS experience. The results are in conjunction with the findings of previous scholars. 
Based on the literature, a MS has a significant relationship with a firm’s CSR, which is  
mentioned in the study of Darnall et al (2008) that concludes that environmental management 
system (EMS) adopters may have a greater propensity to expand their focus beyond their 
organizational boundaries and utilize sustainable practices to minimize environmental impacts 
in supply chain management; the study of Darnall (2006) states that EMS may encourage some 
organizations to expand their environmental consideration beyond their internal operations to 
their suppliers and customers. Moreover, firms with MS usually have more resources to adopt 
CSR initiatives (Darnall et al., 2008). As corporate social performance constitutes the social 
performance of a firm’s participation in CSR initiatives (Wood, 1991), the results on MS 
experience and commitment in corporate social performance correlate with the findings of 
previous scholars.   
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7.1.4 Larger Firms vs. Smaller Firms  
       For the firm size, the results indicate that larger firms have higher level of commitment in 
corporate social performance than smaller firms, which are consistent with the findings of 
previous scholars on Resource-based View (RBV) by Barney (1991) and Edwards et al. (2007).  
Barney argues that larger firms often have more financial resources and capabilities to cope 
with environmental issues. Edwards et al. identify that large firms are more likely to adopt 
CSR codes, as they face two main sources of driving forces, the legitimation and the capacity 
of trade unions and pressures from NGOs. These findings also correspond with the study by 
Bianchi and Noci (1998) which state that compared to larger firms, smaller firms are less likely 
to invest in environmental and other sustainability practices that have long run strategic 
benefits, as smaller firms have resources (labour, time, and costs) are more constrained. 
Therefore, as corporate social performance constitutes the social performance of a firm’s 
participation in CSR initiatives (Wood, 1991), larger firms have a higher level of commitment 
in corporate social performance than smaller firms, as they have more resources to adopt 
sustainability practices in CSR initiatives.  
 
7.2 Implementation and Firm Characteristics 
       After commitment, implementation is another significant step for firms in their social 
performance. The results imply that early adopters of conflict-free sourcing are likely to use 
more time to implement CFSP standards than late early adopters. However, the results indicate 
that none of the independent variables (firm location, ownership structure, MS experience or 
firm size) have a significant relationship with implementation.  
      First, the results indicate that the implementation of a firm is not significantly related to 
whether the firm is from a developing or developed country, which is not consistent with the 
findings of previous scholars that CSR adoption is related to a firm’s country location.    
Second, the results do not provide support for the findings of previous scholar that firms with 
more dispersed ownership structures are more likely to implement CSR practices (Keim, 1978; 
Ullmann, 1985; Oh, Chang & Martynov, 2011). Third, the results indicate that a firm’s MS 
experience does not have a strong relationship with its implementation performance, which is 
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different from the previous scholars who stated that firms with a MS have more capacity to 
implement CSR practices than those without MS experience (Darnall et al., 2008; Darnall, 
2006).Last, it is surprising that the results indicate that firm size does not have a relationship 
with CSR implementation, which is different from the studies of previous scholars that found 
larger firms have more resources to implement sustainability practices (Barney, 1991; Bianchi 
& Noci, 1998; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006).   
 
7.2.1 Management Capacity        
      There are some key discussions and findings required to explain the results of 
implementation. To clarify the reasons for the different results on the commitment group and 
the implementation period, it is necessary to explore the differences between these two 
dependent variables more deeply.  
       In Chapter 5, a firm’s social performance was divided into two aspects: the commitment 
and the implementation. The commitment group was used to measure a firm’s commitment 
performance, which is linked mostly with how a firm reacts to improving corporate social 
performance. However, the variables that are strongly related with the commitment group may 
not be associated with the implementation period, as the commitment group is representative 
on a firm’s reaction to improving social performance, while the implementation period is 
representative of a firm’s internal management capacity. The results indicate that firm location, 
MS experience and firm size have strong relationships with the commitment. Rather than a 
firm’s reaction to improving social performance, the internal management capacity refers to a 
firm’s management capability, including making policies, training employees, and maintaining 
supplier relationships. First, implementing CFSP standards requires firms to make policies to 
regulate the sourcing behaviours and to address conflict issues. Second, firms are also required 
to train employees, so that the employees can be familiar with the policies and the practices of 
the firms.  Recordkeeping is also significant, as firms need to prepare relevant documents that 
are required for audit and to submit to a third-party audit; if the document cannot be prepared 
well, the audit will be delayed or even failed. The purposes of these actions is for each firm to 
have a robust management system that is auditable. If the manage system of a firm is not 
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auditable, the firm needs to take corrective actions to adjust its practices to follow the CFSP 
standards.  Therefore, the results on implementation is different from those on commitment 
because what they represent in corporate social performance are not the same.   
 
 
7.3 Implications for Practice 
       The purpose of the CFSP is to manage social issues by examining practices at the 
chokepoint at smelters and refiners in the metal supply chain. Based on the research of this 
thesis, some implications emerge regarding the practice of CSR in the field.    
        First, this study implies that it is possible that every kind of firm can participate in CSR 
initiatives. In the CFSP, there were two hundred and fifteen compliant smelters by April 2016. 
The ultimate objective of CFSP is to involve all 3TG smelters and refiners in the world in the 
program, so that the global supply chain of metals can be monitored and the social issues, such 
as violation of human rights in conflict areas may be prevented. The list represents a mix of 
firms both from developed or developing countries, with or without MS experience, and that 
vary in size and ownership. Both the results of the thesis and from previous scholars suggest 
that firms from developed countries, with a larger size and established management systems 
commit to CFSP standards earlier than those from developing countries, smaller sized and 
without management systems. However, the CFSP compliant smelter list also contains firms 
from developing countries, without management systems and of smaller sizes.  Although the 
results imply that these firms have a weaker performance in commitment to CFSP protocol 
standards than those early adopters, they finally become compliant regardless of the firm 
location, MS experience and firm size.  The results indicate that every smelter or refiner in the 
world can successfully participate in this initiative. Similarly, as the CFSP is a CSR 
mechanism, it is possible that CSR initiatives can be expanded to be applicable for more firms. 
      Second, CSR initiatives could be applicable beyond the metal industry. For example, this 
mechanism for supply chain could be expanded to other mineral industries besides tin, 
tantalum, tungsten and gold, and also to other commodities, such as agriculture and energy 
products. Moreover, CSR initiatives could be applied not only to manage social issues in 
supply chains, but also to monitor and prevent other sustainability issues happening in supply 
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chains, environmental pollution and over consumption of resources.  For example, the OECD 
continues to place efforts on promoting sustainable consumption in OECD countries, 
addressing the environmental and social characteristics of the products (OECD, 2008).  The 
OECD emphasizes the significance of voluntary labelling, which can help promote sustainable 
consumption through raising issues of reliable certification and verification so as to provide 
transparent information on sustainable and social characteristics of products to consumers 
(OECD, 2008). Therefore, the OECD’s effort indicates that it is possible that sourcing 
transparency in sustainable consumption could be a trend to be expanded through certification 
as a feasible sustainability management tool.  
       The third implication for practice could be a strategic recommendation to industry that 
firm commitment is key in CSR initiatives. The results illustrate that commitment has 
significant relationship with firm location, MS and firm size, but implementation period has 
no relationship with any of the independent variables. Based on the results, commitment is a 
more significant step in adopting CSR than implementation. Getting firms to commit is the 
important step because once committed all types and sizes eventually comply. Therefore, from 
this study, it is recommended that the CSR initiatives can focus more on firms’ commitment 
when when trying to engage participants.   
 
7.4 Implications for Theory 
      Based on the results and the work of previous scholars on the Institutional Theory and 
Stakeholder Theory, the legislative force and market force are two major drivers that push the 
smelters and refiners to participate in CSR initiatives.  
 
7.4.1 Legislative Force 
       According to Institutional Theory, regulatory pressure can impel firms to go beyond 
pursuing sustainability practices, so that the firms will fulfill their social responsibilities 
(Clappison, 2012; Minoja & Zollo 2012; Hallbäck, 2012).  Most of the early CFSP standards 
adopters are located in developed countries, where legislation strongly influences their 
behaviour with a complete conflict-free sourcing-related legislation system. Legislation is a 
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major force that pushes firms in developed countries to adopt conflict-free sourcing.   The US 
is the leader in regulating a firm’s social responsibility in conflict mineral sourcing. The US 
legislation, the Dodd-Frank Section 1502, provides strong legislative framework that forces 
firms to monitor their sourcing, especially from conflict areas. This US effort has been the 
largest force which contributing to the development of responsible sourcing initiatives. 
Because of the efforts of the US government on conflict-free sourcing, OEMs and smelters in 
the US have to follow the regulations of Dodd-Frank Section 1502. Because the regulation 
requires the firms to disclose and report whether their products contain minerals associated 
with conflicts in DRC or adjoining countries. In the commitment groups, early adopters are 
mainly from developed countries (Appendix A).  Smelters and refiners in the US are directly 
facing the pressure from Dodd-Frank Section 1502. For firms from developed countries other 
than the US, such as Europe, they follow their peers in the US. Therefore, according to the 
CFSP participation, CSR initiatives are headed by developed countries, and legislation is a 
significant driver that contributes to the movement of CSR initiatives.  
 
7.4.2 Market Force  
       Based on the results of the research by previous scholars and the results on Institutional 
Theory (Dobers & Halme., 2009; UNDESA, 2007; Zhu et al., 2012), firms from developing 
countries face lower expectations from legislation or voluntary CSR compared to firms from 
developed countries. However, in CFSP, these firms finally exist on the compliant smelter list, 
which proves that CSR initiatives have emerged among all smelters with different 
backgrounds, as all of them have participated in the CFSP. For example, Chinese firms have 
done well in getting into CFSP.  
       Based on the Institutional Theory, market pressure from downstream customers could be 
a driving force for sustainability (Zhu & Sarkis, 2007). Similarly, according to Stakeholder 
Theory, a stakeholder concern can be a driving force to push a firm to adopt sustainability 
practices including social responsibility, and these concerns could be from its customers who 
are important stakeholders (Ball & Craig, 2010).  Market forces could be a potentially strong 
force to pull these firms to engage in the CFSP. Smelters from countries other than the US may 
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not have the legislative pressure from Dodd-Frank Section 1502 directly. However, they have 
pressures from the market.  The global metal supply chain has as deep as eight links (see Figure 
1). Market forces penetrate the supply chain. First, market forces can reach suppliers and 
traders all over the world, as the supply chain has been expanded with globalization; second, 
it also can penetrate deep into the supplier network where eventually the market force reaches 
smelters and refiners in remote areas of the world, which is why they participate in the CFSP. 
This market pressure prompts these smelters and refiners to become CFSP compliant smelters, 
as they need to maintain their relationship with buyers and do not want to lose access to their 
markets. 
 
7.5 Contribution to Literatures 
       To sum up, this study has provided support for the findings of previous studies that the 
Institutional Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Resource-Based View are strongly associated 
with firms’ participation in CSR initiatives. The legislative force and market force from the 
study of the CFSP participation are correspondent with the literatures on Institutional Theory 
and Stakeholder Theory. Literature on Institutional Theory mentioned that legislative pressure 
can push a number of firms to adopt CSR initiatives. In the CFSP, Dodd-Frank Section 1502 
can affect the OEMs and smelters from the US, but cannot reach all smelters.  The market force 
is the main direct pressure that can widely involve firm with different background in CSR 
initiatives. Both the Institutional Theory and Stakeholder Theory mentioned that market 
pressure from downstream customers is a significant driver. In the CFSP, smelters from 
countries other than the US are not affected by regulations directly, but they may face the 
market force from their customers. To maintain the relationship with customers and to keep 
their business, these firms have to follow the requirements from the buyers. The literature on 
Resource-Based View mentioned that that internal resources of large firms have the capability 
to implement CSR practices; however, this study illustrated that small firms can also 
implement CSR practices, as markets reward small businesses with sufficient resources to 
support the costs of taking part in CSR initiatives.  
       In addition, this study provides important findings on the current research about SCM. 
Current research regarding SCM focuses more on environmental issues, and very few studies 
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focus on social issues. This research gap needs to be identified.   This study proves that social 
issues in the supply chain are being noticed.  In the metal industry, firms have begun to pay 
attention to social problems that happen in supply chains and some have participated in CSR 
initiatives such as the CFSP.  Moreover, this study provides the findings that whether a firm 
makes a commitment to improving corporate social performance does not matter much to its 
firm location, MS or size. In this study, that regardless of the firm location, MS and firm size, 
firms can still improve their social performance by participating in the CFSP.  
 
 
7.6 Limitations 
      In this study, the sample representation and the metrics of the variables are two main 
limitations that may have had a negative effect on the validity of the results. 
7.6.1 Sample Representation 
      The major constraint of the study is whether the smelters and refiners on which data are 
collected is a representative sample. For example, the tungsten industry still has quite a number 
of smelters that are not active, or at least not compliant, and therefore not present in the sample 
population of two hundred and fifteen. For tin there are still a set of smelters and refiners being 
identified and that will be participating. For gold, the list is very open-ended, and there may be 
hundreds of facilities that have not been engaged in any way. As more smelters and refiners 
are coming into the CFSP, the sample should be elaborated. What is more, there is an 
uncertainty that the number of future CFSP participants is unpredictable, as there is quite a 
number of smelters being identified or coming into the program. The constraint of the sample 
representation may become a limitation on the commitment group. With the passage of the 
time, more smelters and refiners will participate in the CFSP. The distribution of the 
commitment group, may not meet the diffusion of innovation theory by Rogers. The middle 
majority or the laggards in the current commitment group could be early adopters in the future. 
Besides, this study excluded potential firms that could have been included that are active in or 
identified by CFSP, which could have provided a larger sample size. 
       Thus, in future research, the dataset should be updated as more firms are going to 
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participate in the CFSP. At the very least, it is necessary to look into the most recent lists and 
to discover if additional facilities are being added, as an indication as to whether the rest 
eligible smelters are still joining the list. What is more, the dataset could add the active smelters 
that have not been compliant to enlarge the sample size.  
 
7.6.2 Metrics of Independent and Dependent Variables 
       For ownership, the decision making on CSR adoption in joint-ventures firms could be 
further investigated. In this study, the shareholders who own the most shares are considered to 
have the power to make the final decisions in a firm’s management, including CSR relevant 
practices. However, the real situation could be more complicated. In some developing 
countries, governments play a more significant role in market operation and administration 
than in developed countries such as China. In some joint-venture firms containing national 
capital, the government may have more decision-making power than shareholders.  Moreover, 
the personal view of the manager is ignored in this study. A manger’s acceptance on CSR could 
affect whether a firm adopt CSR initiatives or not. A traditional manager could be a laggard in 
adopting CSR initiatives, while a new generational manager could be braver to adopt CSR 
initiatives earlier than others.  In future research, more factors should be considered when 
examining ownership structure in the field of CSR. 
        For the MS experience, the presence of ISO or similar MS certifications is adopted to 
represent whether a firm has MS experience. However, a limitation exists on using ISO 
certification to measure the MS experience of the two hundred and fifteen CFSP compliant 
smelters. First, ISO certification may not be advertised, which is difficult to ensure that all 
firms owning ISO certification could be confirmed. Second, the MS experience could be 
presented without the visibility of an ISO or similar MS certification. Therefore, the prevalence 
of this measure was likely underestimated. In some cases, the MS experience could be obtained 
from examining daily operations, not just from a ISO or similar MS certifications.  This kind 
of MS experience without an ISO or similar MS certification is difficult to measure. Therefore, 
in future research, more accurate measurement of the MS experience of a firm should be 
identified.   
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      The number of employees is selected in this study to measure firm size. It was argued, for 
example, that tin smelters are labour intensive businesses and the number of employees can 
reflect the firm size. However, it may not accurately evaluate the firm size for capital intensive 
or technologically intensive firms. In addition, other size characteristic factors, such as market 
capitalization, total sales, export sales volume, and percentage of sales as exports need to be 
investigated. Future research in this area could be expanded in other industries, which are not 
labour intensive, could utilize the indicators of revenue or total assets as a way to measure the 
firm size and should be integrated into future research. Given the spectrum of sizes of firms 
considered (from 12 to over 177,000 employees) the limitation of this metric is likely low.  
     For the implementation period, gold smelters and refiners that have already participated in 
gold programs, such as RJC and LBMA, thereby their Implementation Period is recorded as 
one day in section 5.1.1.2. The reason is that they are quick implementer of conflict-free 
sourcing because they have already engaged in conflict mineral sourcing.  However, the time 
for such a firm to implement LBMA or RJC standards would not be one day. It is possible that 
the real time for implementation in their gold initiatives is more than one day. In this case, the 
implementation period of these smelters cannot accurately represent how long it takes them to 
implement the conflict-free sourcing policies and management systems. Therefore, in the 
future research, it is necessary to collect the information on the actual implementation period 
of these gold smelters that can objectively reflect their ability to execute conflict mineral 
sourcing policies and management systems.  
       Another limitation for implementation period is based on the results in Chapter 6. The 
results on the relationship between commitment group and implementation period illustrate 
that some leaders become active before the initial protocols of the CFSP are published; 
therefore, as the audit protocols have not been published, it is difficult for these leaders to 
follow complete protocol standards and their implementation is delayed. However, after the 
protocols are published, the complete standards are established for more smelters to follow. 
Therefore, the late participants use less time than smelters who have committed before the 
complete audit protocols are published, which cannot accurately represent the implementation 
of some firms.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
      This study provides new insight into how a firm can deal with their CSR by using the 
indicator of its CFSP participation where there is a high expectation for firms to behave in a 
CSR manner. The broad concept from this study is based on many trends that appear in the 
individual analyses of the data. The results in the thesis report that (1) the country location is 
associated with a firm’s social performance, and firms from developed countries adopt CSR 
standards earlier than those from developing countries; (2) the management system(MS) 
experience is associated with a firm’s social performance, and firms with MS experience adopt 
CSR standards earlier than those without MS experience; (3) the firm size, especially the 
number of employees, is associated with a firm’s social performance in labour intensive 
business, and larger firms adopt CSR standards earlier than smaller firms.  However, the results 
indicate that firm ownership does not have significant relationship with CSR adoption; in 
addition, the results show that these independent variables do not have a significant 
relationship with CSR implementation, because implementation is linked more with a firm’s 
management capability than its social responsibility performance. Based on the results, it is 
concluded that a legislative force and market force are two main drivers that push a firm to 
adopt CSR initiatives. In this study, the systematic review of the literatures, coupled with the 
experiences and perspectives from the data analysis on two hundred and fifteen CFSP 
compliant smelters and refiners help highlight and guide future meaningful research in this 
area of CSR. 
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Appendix A  Tantalum Facilities 
Smelter Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Changsha South Tantalum Niobium Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 1 200 
Conghua Tantalum and Niobium Smeltry CHINA State-owned 1 300 
D Block Metals, LLC. UNITED STATES Private 0 150 
Duoluoshan CHINA Private 1 600 
Exotech Inc. UNITED STATES Private 0 60 
F&X Electro-Materials Limited CHINA Private 1 130 
FIR Metal & Resources Ltd. CHINA Private 0 50 
Global Advanced Metals AUSTRIA Private 1 6000 
Global Advanced Metals AUSTRIA Private 1 3000 
Guangdong Zhiyuan New Material Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 1000 
Guizhou Zhenhua Xinyun Technology CHINA State-owned 0 200 
H.C. Starck - Hermsdorf GmbH GERMANY Private 1 103 
H.C. Starck Co. Ltd. - Thailand GERMANY Private 1 235 
H.C. Starck GmbH - Goslar GERMANY Private 1 980 
H.C. Starck GmbH - Laufenburg #1 GERMANY Private 1 163 
H.C. Starck Inc. - Newton GERMANY Private 1 454 
H.C. Starck Ltd. – Mito GERMANY Private 1 72 
H.C. Starck Smelting GmbH & Co. KG -   
Laufenberg #2 
GERMANY Private 1 164 
Hengyang King Xing Lifeng New Materials Co. 
Ltd. 
CHINA Private 1 70 
Hi-Temp Specialty Metals, Inc. UNITED STATES Private 0 200 
  77 
Smelter Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Jiangxi Dinghai Tantalum & Niobium Co., Ltd CHINA Private 1 100 
JiuJiang JinXin Nonferrous Metals Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 1 100 
JiuJiang Tanbre Co. Ltd. CHINA State-owned 1 600 
Jiujiang Zhongao Tantalum & Niobium Co., Ltd CHINA Private 1 180 
Kemet Blue Metals UNITED STATES Publicly traded 1 9300 
Kemet Blue Powder UNITED STATES Publicly traded 1 9300 
King-Tan Tantalum Industry Ltd. CHINA Private 1 200 
LSM Brasil S.A. BRAZIL Private 1 375 
Metallurgical Products India Pvt. Ltd. (MPIL) UNITED STATES Private 0 60 
Mineracao Taboca S.A. PERU Private 1 750 
Mitsui Mining & Smelting JAPAN publicly traded 1 1802 
Molycorp Silmet A.S. UNITED STATES Private 1 2400 
Ningxia Orient Tantalum Industry Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 2419 
Plansee SE Liezen AUSTRIA Private 1 6000 
Plansee SE Reutte AUSTRIA Private 1 6000 
QuantumClean UNITED STATES Private 1 100 
Resind Indústria e Comércio Ltda BRAZIL Private 0 60 
RFH Tantalum Smeltry Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 1 50 
Solikamsk Metal Works RUSSIA 
FEDERATION 
Publicly traded 1 2848 
Taki Chemicals JAPAN Publicly traded 0 560 
Telex Metals UNITED STATES Private 1 19 
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Smelter Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Tranzact, Inc. UNITED STATES Publicly traded 0 549 
Ulba Metallurgical Plant JSC KAZAKHSTAN Publicly traded 1 6000 
XinXing Haorong Electronic Material Co. Ltd. CHINA private 1 50 
Yichun Jin  New MaterialCo. Ltd. CHINA Private 0 100 
Zhuzhou Cemented Carbide Group Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 9000 
 
 
Note:  Management System (MS): 0=Not having ISO or similar management system certifications 
                                                         1= Having ISO or similar management system certifications 
        Size: Number of employees 
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Appendix B Gold Facilities 
 
Smelter  Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Aida Chemical Industries Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 0 441 
AllgemeineGold-und Silberscheideanstalt A.G. GERMANY Private 0 401 
AngloGold Ashanti Corrego do Sitio Minercao SOUTH AFRICA Publicly traded 1 6321 
Argor-Heraeus SA SWITZERLAND Private 0 280 
Asahi Pretec Corporation JAPAN Publicly traded 1 1700 
Asahi Refining Canada Ltd. JAPAN Publicly traded 1 1700 
Asahi Refining USA Inc. JAPAN Publicly traded 1 1700 
Asaka Riken Co Ltd. JAPAN Publicly traded 0 170 
Atasay Kuyumculuk Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. TURKEY Private 0 60 
Aurubis AG GERMANY Publicly traded 1 4700 
Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) PHILIPPINES State-owned 1 5050 
Boliden AB SWEDEN Publicly traded 1 4881 
C. Hafner GmbH + Co. KG GERMANY Private 0 200 
CCR Refinery Glencore Canada Corporation CANADA Publicly traded 0 550 
Chimet S.p.A. ITALY Private 1 150 
Doduco GERMANY Private 1 1210 
Dowa JAPAN Publicly traded 1 5941 
Eco-System Recycling Co. Ltd. JAPAN Publicly traded 1 5941 
Elemetal Refining, LLC UNITED STATES Private 1 225 
Emirates Gold DMCC UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
Private 1 100 
Heimerle + Meule GmbH GERMANY Private 1 750 
Heraeus Ltd. Hong Kong GERMANY Private 0 152 
Heraeus Precious Metals GmbH & Co. KG GERMANY Private 1 13300 
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Smelter  Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Ishifuku Metal Industry Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 400 
Istanbul Gold Refinery TURKEY Private 1 150 
Japan Mint JAPAN Publicly traded 1 1050 
Jiangxi Copper Company Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 0 34000 
JSC Ekaterinburg Non-Ferrous Metal Processing Plant RUSSIAN FEDERATION Private 0 565 
JSC Uralectromed RUSSIAN FEDERATION Publicly traded 0 350 
JX Nippon Mining & Metals Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 0 2070 
Kazzinc Ltd. KAZAKHSTAN State-owned 1 10000 
Kennecott Utah Copper LLC UNITED STATES Private 1 2000 
Kojima Chemicals Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 0 168 
L'azurde Company for Jewelry SAUDI ARABIA Private 0 500 
LS-NIKKO Copper Inc. UNITED STATES Private 0 750 
Materion UNITED STATES Publicly traded 1 2800 
Matsuda Sangyo Co. Ltd. JAPAN Publicly traded 0 989 
Metalor Technologies (Hong Kong) Ltd. SWITZERLAND Private 0 77 
Metalor Technologies (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. SWITZERLAND Private 1 41 
Metalor Technologies SA SWITZERLAND Private 1 1700 
Metalor USA Refining Corporation SWITZERLAND Private 1 90 
Met-Mex Penoles S.A. MEXICO Publicly traded 0 8967 
Mitsubishi Materials Corporation JAPAN Publicly traded 1 23413 
Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 2200 
MMTC-PAMP India Pvt Ltd. INDIA Private 1 258 
Moscow Special Alloys Processing Plant RUSSIAN FEDERATION Private 0 690 
Nadir Metal Rafineri San. Ve Tic. A.Az. TURKEY Private 0 100 
Nihon Material Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 100 
Ögussa Österreichische Gold- und Silber-Scheideanstalt 
GmbH 
AUSTRIA Private 0 140 
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Smelter  Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Ohura Precious Metal Industry Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 75 
OJSC - The Gulidov Krasnoyarsk Non-Ferrous Metals Plant 
(OJSC Krastsvetmet) 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Publicly traded 0 2763 
OJSC Novosibirsk Refinery RUSSIAN FEDERATION Publicly traded 0 180 
Prioksky Plant of Non-Ferrous Metals RUSSIAN FEDERATION Publicly traded 0 485 
Produits Artistiques Metaux Precieux (PAMP) SA SWITZERLAND Private 0 220 
PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) Tbk INDONESIA State-owned 0 200 
PX Precinox SA SWITZERLAND Private 0 500 
Rand Refinery (Pty) Ltd. SOUTH AFRICA Private 1 513 
Republic Metals Corporation UNITED STATES Private 1 200 
Royal Canadian Mint CANADA State-owned 1 1000 
Schone Edelmetaal NETHERLANDS Private 1 18568 
SEMPSA Joyeria Plateria SA GERMANY Private 1 250 
Shandong Zhaojin Gold & Silver Refinery Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 0 600 
Sichuan Tianze Precious Metals Co. Ltd. CHINA State-owned 0 1000 
Singway Technology Co., Ltd. TAIWAN Publicly traded 1 180 
SOE Shyolkovsky Factory of Secondary Precious Metals RUSSIAN FEDERATION Private 0 400 
Solar Applied Materials Technology Corp. TAIWAN Publicly traded 0 1517 
Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. Ltd. JAPAN Publicly traded 0 8766 
T.C.A. S.p.A ITALY Private 0 100 
Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K.K. JAPAN Private 1 3600 
The Refinery of Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 0 12985 
Tokuriki Honten Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 0 280 
Umicore Brasil Ltda BELGIUM Publicly traded 1 14101 
Umicore Precious Metals Thailand BELGIUM Publicly traded 1 14101 
Umicore SA Business Unit Precious Metals Refining BELGIUM Publicly traded 1 14101 
United Precious Metal Refining, Inc. UNITED STATES Private 0 75 
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Smelter  Firm Location  Ownership MS  Size 
Valcambi S.A. SWITZERLAND Private 1 177 
Western Australian Mint trading as The Perth Mint AUSTRALIA State-owned 0 100 
Yamamoto Precious Metal CO. LTD. JAPAN Private 0 258 
Yokohama Metal Co., Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 242 
Zhongyuan Gold Smelter of Zhongjin Gold Corporation CHINA Publicly traded 1 27721 
Zijin Mining Group Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 0 20755 
 
 
Note:  Management System (MS): 0=Not having ISO or similar management system certifications 
                                                         1= Having ISO or similar management system certifications 
            Size: Number of employees 
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Appendix C Tin Facilities 
 
Smelter Firm Location Ownership MS Size 
Alpha UNITED STATES Private 1 500 
China Tin Group Co., Ltd. CHINA Private 1 11000 
Coopermetal - Cooperativa Metalurgica De 
Rondonia Ltda. 
BRAZIL Private 0 1000 
CV Ayi Jaya INDONESIA Private 0 80 
CV Gita Pesona INDONESIA Private 0 92 
CV Serumpun Sebalai INDONESIA Private 0 58 
CV United Smelting INDONESIA Private 0 261 
CV Venus Inti Perkasa INDONESIA Private 0 109 
Dowa JAPAN Publicly traded 0 5941 
Elmet S.L.U (Metallo Group) BELGIUM Private 1 201 
EM Vinto BOLIVIA Private 0 700 
Fenix Metals POLAND Private 0 50 
Gejiu Non-Ferrous Metal Processing Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 0 359 
Jiangxi Ketai Advanced Material Co., Ltd. CHINA Private 0 100 
Magnu's Minerais Metais e Ligas LTDA BRAZIL Private 0 400 
Malaysia Smelting Corporation (MSC) MALAYSIA Private 0 1500 
Melt Metais e Ligas S/A BRAZIL Private 1 200 
Metallic Resources, Inc UNITED STATES Private 1 27 
Metallo Chimique BELGIUM Private 1 201 
  84 
Smelter Firm Location Ownership MS Size 
Mineracao Taboca S.A. PERU Private 1 1206 
Minsur PERU Private 0 1206 
Mitsubishi Materials Corporation JAPAN Publicly traded 1 23413 
O.M. Manufacturing (Thailand) Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 0 75 
O.M. Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. JAPAN Private 0 75 
Operaciones Metalurgical SA BOLIVIA Private 0 200 
PT Aries Kencana Sejahtera INDONESIA Private 0 162 
PT Artha Cipta Langgeng INDONESIA Private 0 68 
PT ATD Makmur Mandili Jaya INDONESIA Private 0 150 
PT Babel Inti Perkasa INDONESIA Publicly traded 0 139 
PT Bangka Prima Tin INDONESIA Private 0 59 
PT Bangka Tin Industry INDONESIA Private 0 171 
PT Belitung Industri Sejahtera INDONESIA Private 0 150 
PT BilliTin Makmur Lestari INDONESIA Private 0 97 
PT Bukit Timah INDONESIA Publicly traded 0 351 
PT Cipta Persada Mulia INDONESIA Private 0 61 
PT DS Jaya Abadi INDONESIA Private 0 117 
PT Eunindo Usaha Mandiri INDONESIA Private 0 90 
PT Inti Stania Prima INDONESIA private 0 144 
PT Justindo INDONESIA private 0 75 
PT Mitra Stania Prima INDONESIA Private 1 50 
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Smelter Firm Location Ownership MS Size 
PT Panca Mega Persada INDONESIA Private 0 22 
PT Prima Timah Utama INDONESIA Private 1 1072 
PT Refined Banka Tin INDONESIA Private 1 75 
PT Sariwiguna Binasentosa INDONESIA Private 0 99 
PT Stanindo Inti Perkasa INDONESIA Private 0 90 
PT Sukses Inti Makmur INDONESIA Private 0 48 
PT Sumber Jaya Indah INDONESIA Private 0 90 
PT Timah (Persero) Tbk Kundur INDONESIA publicly traded 1 1300 
PT Timah (Persero) Tbk Mentok INDONESIA publicly traded 1 2063 
PT Tinindo Inter Nusa INDONESIA Private 0 170 
PT Tommy Utama INDONESIA Private 0 126 
PT Wahana Perkit Jaya INDONESIA Private 0 12 
Resind Indústria e Comércio Ltda BRAZIL Private 0 20 
Rui Da Hung TAIWAN Private 1 56 
Soft Metais Ltda. BRAZIL Private 1 20 
Thaisarco THAILAND Private 1 1760 
VQB Mineral and Trading Group JSC VIETNAM Private 0 400 
White Solder Metalurgia e Mineracao Ltda. BRAZIL Private 1 200 
Yunnan Tin Company Ltd. CHINA State-owned 1 60000 
 
Note:  Management System (MS): 0=Not having ISO or similar management system certifications 
                                                         1= Having ISO or similar management system certifications 
       Size: Number of employees 
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Appendix D Tungsten Facilities 
 
Smelter Firm Location Ownership MS  Size 
A.L.M.T. TUNGSTEN Corp. JAPAN Private 1 2315 
Asia Tungsten Products Vietnam Ltd CHINA Private 1 750 
Chenzhou Diamond Tungsten Products 
Co.,Ltd. 
CHINA State-owned 1 272 
Chongyi Zhangyuan Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 3380 
Fujian Jinxin Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 1 500 
Ganzhou Huaxing Tungsten Products Co. Ltd. CHINA State-owned 1 244 
Ganzhou Jiangwu Ferrotungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA State-owned 1 750 
Ganzhou Seadragon W & Mo Co., Ltd. CHINA Private 1 500 
Ganzhou Yatai Tungsten Co.,Ltd UNITED STATES Private 0 750 
Global Tungsten & Powders Corp. UNITED STATES Private 1 5000 
Guangdong Xianglu Tungsten Co., Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 0 500 
H.C. Starck GmbH GERMANY Private 1 2925 
H.C. Starck Smelting GmbH & Co.KG GERMANY Private 1 2926 
Hunan Chenzhou Mining Group Co. CHINA private 1 750 
Hunan Chun-Chang Nonferrous Smelting & 
Concentrating Co. Ltd. 
CHINA Private 0 320 
Hydrometallurg JSC RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
Private 0 100 
Japan New Metals Co. Ltd. JAPAN Private 1 750 
Jiangxi Gan Bei Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA State-owned 1 177000 
Jiangxi Xiushui Xianggan Nonferrous Metals 
Co., Ltd. 
CHINA State-owned 0 75 
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Smelter Firm Location Ownership MS  Size 
Kennametal Huntsville UNITED STATES Publicly traded 1 12718 
Malipo Haiyu Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 11250 
Niagara Refining LLC UNITED STATES Private 0 100 
Nui Phao H.C. Starck Tungsten Chemicals 
Manufacturing LLC 
GERMANY Private 0 2926 
Tejing Tungsten Co. Ltd. UNITED STATES Private 1 200 
Vietnam Youngsun Tungsten Industry Co., Ltd. CHINA Private 1 500 
Wolfram Bergbau und Hutten AG AUSTRIA Private 1 250 
Xiamen Tungsten (H.C) Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 11135 
Xiamen Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA Publicly traded 1 11135 
Xinhai Rendan Shaoguan Tungsten Co. Ltd. CHINA Private 1 75 
 
 
Note:  Management System (MS): 0=Not having ISO or similar management system certifications 
                                                         1= Having ISO or similar management system certifications 
           Size: Number of employees             
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Appendix E Gold Facilities That Have Participated in RJC or LBMA 
 
Smelter  Firm Location  Gold 
Programs 
Implementation 
Period (Day) 
Allgemeine Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt A.G. GERMANY LBMA & RJC 1 
Aurubis AG GERMANY LBMA  1 
Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas  PHILIPPINES LBMA 1 
Boliden AB SWEDEN LBMA 1 
Emirates Gold DMCC UNITED ARAB EMIRATES LBMA 1 
Jiangxi Copper Company Ltd. CHINA LBMA 1 
JX Nippon Mining & Metals Co. Ltd. JAPAN LBMA 1 
Kazzinc Ltd. KAZAKHSTAN LBMA 1 
L'azurde Company for Jewelry SAUDI ARABIA LBMA 1 
Mitsubishi Materials Corporation JAPAN LBMA 1 
Mitsui Mining and Smelting Co. Ltd. JAPAN LBMA 1 
MMTC-PAMP India Pvt Ltd. INDIA LBMA 1 
Moscow Special Alloys Processing Plant RUSSIAN FEDERATION LBMA 1 
Ögussa Österreichische Gold- und Silber-
Scheideanstalt GmbH 
AUSTRIA RJC 1 
OJSC Novosibirsk Refinery RUSSIAN FEDERATION LBMA 1 
PAMP S.A. SWITZERLAND LBMA 1 
Prioksky Plant of Non-Ferrous Metals RUSSIAN FEDERATION LBMA 1 
PT Aneka Tambang (Persero) Tbk INDONESIA LBMA 1 
Republic Metals Corporation UNITED STATES LBMA & RJC 1 
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Smelter  Firm Location  Gold 
Programs 
Implementation 
Period (Day) 
Schone Edelmetaal NETHERLANDS LBMA 1 
Shandong Zhaojin Gold & Silver Refinery Co. Ltd. CHINA LBMA 1 
The Refinery of Shandong Gold Mining Co. Ltd. CHINA LBMA 1 
Umicore Precious Metals Thailand BELGIUM RJC 1 
Zhongyuan Gold Smelter of Zhongjin Gold 
Corporation 
CHINA LBMA 1 
Zijin Mining Group Co. Ltd. CHINA LBMA 1 
 
